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t
This Article explains the monopoly rationale for conventional approaches
to telecommunications regulation, demonstrates how the U.S.
telecommunications market has changed since the Telecommunications Act of
1996, and then examines whether, in the light of those changes, the
conventional approach remains an appropriate paradigm for U.S.
telecommunications policy. This Article finds that the general answer is no, and
that ex ante regulation that depends for its rationale on monopoly market
structure should give way to ex post intervention against specific, anti-
competitive acts on the model of conventional antitrust and competition policy.
The Article finds, however, that certain kinds of regulation-notably
interconnection-still have a role to play in advancing telecommunications
policy objectives. This study's conclusions thus challenge the argument that
policymakers should wait until market conditions become more competitive to
deregulate. But it also challenges claims that the market has developed to the
point that Congress should eliminate all industry-specific regulation and
regulatory authority in the U.S. telecommunications market. This Article
instead proposes eliminating ex ante regulation that depends on monopoly for
its rationale in favor of ex post competition enforcement, but makes allowance
for other regulation in those specific circumstances where experience proves
such intervention necessary and effective for protecting consumer welfare.
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Introduction
The telecommunications market in the United States has changed
dramatically over the last decade. The communications options for average
consumers have expanded beyond the offerings of their incumbent telephone
companies to include new telephone carriers, email, wireless telephone service,
and voice over the Internet. I Yet strikingly, much of the regulatory approach to
local telecommunications that arose in the monopoly era remains in place
today.
This Article examines whether conventional approaches to monopoly
regulation continue to be good policy given the current market for
telecommunications services in the United States. By "conventional" monopoly
I By early 2005, 99.8% of the U.S. population lived in counties offering some kind of digital
mobile telephone service; 97% of the U.S. population lived in counties offering at least three different
mobile telephone operators. See FCC, ANNUAL REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE MARKET
CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES 46, 77 (2005), available at




regulation I mean a regime of specific rules that sets out, in advance,
requirements and restrictions on business conduct by firms in a particular
industry. My focus is on economic regulation as opposed to public-safety or
distributional regulation, although I shall touch on those issues in the Article as
well. Economic rules in telecommunications have involved rate regulation and
tariff-filing obligations, requirements on scope and quality of service, limits on
entry into related lines of business, duties to deal with new entrants, and other
prospective governance of business behavior.2 Such rules apply mostly, if not
exclusively, to large incumbent firms and much less, if at all, to new entrants or
fringe firms in the industry.3 The question to be addressed is whether, in the
light of changes in telecommunications markets over the past decade, ex ante,
dominant-firm restraints remain an appropriate mode of telecommunications
regulation.
This Article finds that the general answer is no, and that ex ante regulation
that depends for its rationale on monopoly market structure should give way to
ex post intervention against specific, anti-competitive acts on the model of
conventional antitrust and competition policy, with resort to ex ante rules only
where experience provides a compelling case that such rules are necessary to
protect consumer welfare. The Article finds, however, that certain kinds of
regulation-most notably basic network interconnection rules-still have a role
to play in advancing telecommunications policy objectives. This study's
conclusions thus challenge the argument that policymakers should wait until
market conditions become more competitive to deregulate. But it also
challenges claims that the market has developed to the point that Congress
should eliminate all industry-specific regulation and regulatory authority in the
U.S. telecommunications market. In arguing for a transformative shift away
from mandatory ex ante rules, this Article thus does not recommend legislation
that would prohibit ex ante regulation altogether. This Article instead proposes
an approach that would eliminate ex ante regulation that depends on monopoly
for its rationale in favor of ex post competition enforcement; but that would
allow for other regulation (e.g. interconnection) in specific circumstances
where experience proves such intervention necessary and effective for
protecting consumer welfare.
Part I of this Article explains how the purposes, rationale, and potential
benefits of telephone regulation have depended on the monopoly structure of
the local telecommunications market. Part II examines how the local telephone
market has transformed over the past decade, arguing that the market no longer
resembles the monopoly that gave rise to existing regulations. Part III examines
the regulatory implications of the change in market structure for local
2 See PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH
COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES 35-81 (1996).
3 Id. at 61-69.
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telecommunications, describing why the changing balance of regulatory costs
and benefits accompanying the change in market structure warrants a new
regulatory approach-an approach that emphasizes post-conduct enforcement
against anticompetitive activities instead of ex ante restrictions and
requirements on firm activities. Part III also discusses precedents and evidence
from previous episodes of deregulation in the United States-both in
telecommunications and in other industries-and explains how those
experiences and evidence support a deregulatory shift in U.S.
telecommunications policy sooner rather than later. Part IV concludes.
I. Historical Goals and Underlying Assumptions of Telecommunications
Regulation
This Part of the Article addresses the goals of telecommunications
regulation over the course of the past century. It then explains the monopoly
assumptions that underlie those objectives and the means through which state
and federal regulators have pursued them.
A. Telephone Regulation Before 1996
For most of the past century, the U.S. telecommunications industry has
been subject to monopoly regulation. There are good reasons to believe that,
early on, the United States could have avoided telephone monopolies in favor
of a competitive marketplace. By 1908, AT&T and its collected rivals each
carried about 16 million telephone calls per day.4  But AT&T denied
interconnection to its rivals, preventing subscribers of competing carriers from
making calls to, or receiving calls from, AT&T's subscribers. Unable to
promise their subscribers access to AT&T's larger base of customers,
individual competitors struggled and, in the years leading up to World War I,
AT&T aggressively acquired those weakened rivals. 5 By the 1920s
telecommunications in the United States had become the business of state-
franchised monopolies operated by AT&T (known as "the Bell System") and
regulated by state public utility authorities.
6
If the reasons for having a telecommunications monopoly were slippery,
the reasons for regulating that monopoly were not: The market came to contain
a dominant provider of an important service, a provider that had apparent
4 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 2, at 783 (1975).
5 See Howard A. Shelanski, A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local
Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1617, 1626-27 (1999) (explaining the failure of the government
to prevent AT&T's strategy and the rise of the Bell System monopoly).
6 See ARTHUR W. PAGE, THE BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM 2-3 (1941) (describing how, by 1919,
forty-five states and the District of Columbia had commissions charged with telephone regulation).
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power to set prices and control output.7 It seemed clear that AT&T would, if
unregulated, use that power to fatten profits at the expense of consumers, to
refrain from serving less profitable customers, and to extend market power into
new or adjacent lines of business. 8 From these perceived hazards emerged three
principal objectives of telephone regulation.
1. Retail Price Regulation
The first objective of regulation, in response to the pricing power that
monopolists typically wield, was to keep retail prices "reasonable" and below
monopoly levels. For most of the twentieth century, state agencies and the FCC
pursued this goal through oversight and constraint of the retail rates the AT&T
companies could charge for calls in and between their respective state service
areas. 9 Regulators came to focus on setting rates that would provide the carrier
with a reasonable rate of return on its costs of providing service.10 In a typical
rate proceeding AT&T would file a tariff with a proposed rate, provide cost
data, and receive approval to charge rates that brought a return typically in the
range of 11% over those costs.1 I Because of concerns about the harmful
incentive effects of such "rate-of-return" regulation (see infra Section III.A), in
the 1980s state and federal regulators began to experiment with alternative
forms of incentive-based regulation. Specifically, a number of jurisdictions
began to use a method of price regulation known as "price caps," in which
regulators capped prices carriers could charge, but allowed carriers to keep any
profit they could manage within the caps.
2
Although local telephone rates were subject only to state regulation, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had authority (often only weakly
exercised) to regulate interstate, long-distance calling rates at the federal
level. 13 While AT&T charged flat monthly fees for local service, it charged by
the minute for long-distance service, and the FCC allowed AT&T to set long-
distance rates well above cost for the purpose-at first implicit and later
expressly stated-of providing profits AT&T could use to cross-subsidize local
7 See STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 614-18 (2001).
8 See, e.g., PAGE, supra note 6, at 3 (describing how the public felt a need for control of prices
and service as monopoly came to supplant competition in telephone service).
9 See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873, 2884 (Apr.
17, 1989). For an example of such regulation at the state level, see, e.g., Illinois Bell. Tel. Co. v.
O'Connell-Diaz, No. 05 C 1149, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70221, at *10 (N.D. I11. Sept. 28, 2006)
(discussing history of traditional rate regulation in Illinois).
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., In re AT&T, 86 F.C.C.2d 221 (1981), for a typical example of such a filing and
rate of return.
12 4 F.C.C.R. at 2893-96.
13 See, e.g., In re AT&T Charges for Interstate Tel. Service, 51 F.C.C.2d 619 (1975), for an
example of such interstate rate regulation by the FCC.
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rates in support of universal service policies (see below). 14 Although virtually
no federal regulation of rates for interstate (i.e., long-distance) telephone
service remains, regulation of retail rates for local telephone service is the
exclusive domain of state authorities under Section 152(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934 and remains very much in place.
15
2. Universal Service Regulation
The second objective of monopoly regulation was to guarantee access by
all Americans to affordable telephone services.' 6 This "universal service"
objective was a response to the concern that some citizens might not share in
the benefits of telephone service because they were not profitable for carriers to
serve. 17 In granting monopoly franchises to AT&T, state regulators found an
opportunity to demand things in return. One of the key conditions of the
monopoly grants was that the Bell System would provide quality service to all
consumers, and do so at fair and generally equal rates.'
8
Universal service regulation accomplished two things. First, the policy
arguably sped the deployment of a high-quality telecommunications network to
virtually all Americans. Second, it led to rate structures through which some
kinds of consumers and services subsidized other consumers and services. For
example, it costs carriers less to serve customers in dense urban areas than to
serve more dispersed customers in rural areas. 19 Under universal service
policies, however, both sets of subscribers typically pay the same monthly rate
for local service. That rate is above the carrier's cost of providing telephone
service to urban customers but below the carrier's cost of serving rural
households; the profits from the former subsidize the losses from the latter.
20
Similar cross-subsidies have occurred from business customers to residential
customers and from long-distance telephone service to local service.
2 1
Universal service thus became deeply enmeshed in the monopoly structure of
telecommunications because the subsidy flows on which the policies depended
were much easier to organize within a single entity than among competing
service providers.
14 BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 618-19.
15 47 U.S.C.S. § 152(b) (2006).
16 BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 618-19.
17 The term "universal service" did not have such public-spirited origins. It was instead a
corporate slogan of AT&T's chairman, Theodore Vail, who meant by "universal service" that AT&T
would be the sole provider of service everywhere. It was, in other words, a term for the company's
ambitions of monopoly. See id.
18 Id. at 619.
19 Id.




3. Limiting Monopoly Scope
The third objective of telecommunications regulation was to control the
scope of AT&T's monopoly. The Bell System encompassed not just the state-
by-state franchise monopolies over local service, but also nationwide long-
distance telephone service, customer equipment (i.e., telephones), and network
equipment (i.e., switches and other elements of the phone system). How many
of these different markets should AT&T be able to monopolize? Partly through
regulation, but also through antitrust enforcement, the scope of AT&T's
monopoly flowed and ultimately ebbed over the course of the last century.
For example, AT&T early on required monthly rental fees for the use of
telephone handsets as part of the carrier's local rate tariffs.12 AT&T thus
prevented competing telephone manufacturers from entering the market
because consumers would have to pay the competitor's handset price in
addition to the rental fee already included in AT&T's local tariff. When new
kinds of customer-end equipment became available on the market, early
answering machines for example, AT&T placed "foreign attachment"
prohibitions in its local tariffs that barred customers from attaching any non-
AT&T equipment to the network.23 In 1947 the FCC questioned such
restrictions and struck down AT&T's prohibition on the attachment of devices
24to record telephone calls. AT&T did not even manufacture such devices but
evidently wished to reserve that market for itself. The FCC ruled the
company's monopoly could not extend so far.25
Over the next several years the FCC vacillated over AT&T's ability to bar
competing "customer premises equipment" (CPE), allowing states to bar an
early answering machine called the Jordaphone in 195426 and, in a bizarre
decision, upholding AT&T's prohibition on use of the Hush-a-Phone, a simple
device that covered a telephone's mouthpiece to increase privacy, in 1955.
27
But following the U.S. Court of Appeals' sharp reversal of the Hush-a-Phone
decision, the trend turned strongly against AT&T's extension of its monopoly
into CPE. In 1968 the Commission found AT&T's tariffs that flatly prohibited
customers from attaching non-AT&T equipment to be improperly
discriminatory. 28 While the FCC did continue to approve some tariffs that had
attachment prohibitions, the agency began to scrutinize such provisions
carefully and skeptically; the Commission eventually went to court to preempt
22 Id. at 624.
23 Id. at 624-25 (excerpting from PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW (1992)).
24 Use of Recording Devices in Connection with Telephone Service, II F.C.C. 1033 (1947).
25 Id. at 1048.
26 In re Jordaphone Corp. of Am., 18 F.C.C. 644 (1954).
27 In re Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 F.C.C. 391, 397 (1955).
28 Carter v. AT&T, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
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state laws that prohibited or restricted attachment of customer-supplied (as
opposed to AT&T-supplied) equipment to the network.
29
The FCC also pared back the extent of AT&T's control over the long-
distance market. Beginning with a seemingly innocuous ruling in 1959
allowing private, commercial use of certain radio frequencies, 30 the
Commission opened the door for a small company known as Microwave
Communications Inc. (later MCI) to provide fixed, wireless transmission of
long-distance phone calls.3 1 The FCC, with the courts playing a role, eventually
rejected AT&T's arguments against allowing entry into the long-distance
telephone market and issued a series of orders authorizing MCI to provide
service that increasingly competed with AT&T's long-distance business.
32
AT&T's resistance to long-distance competition was central to the Justice
Department's 1974 antitrust suit that culminated in the 1984 break-up of
AT&T.33 That break-up, known as the AT&T "divestiture," divided the Bell
System into seven, independent "Regional Bell Operating Companies"
(RBOCs) providing local phone service, and a separate company, retaining the
AT&T name, that provided long-distance service and manufactured
equipment. 34 After divestiture, AT&T's equipment and long-distance
monopolies were finished. Local exchange service remained a monopoly, but
one that no longer had a corporate connection to the provision of long-distance
service or equipment. The RBOCs and other incumbent local carriers continued
to be regulated as monopolies in accordance with the three objectives just
described:35 States regulated their retail rates (increasingly through price caps),
a combination of state and federal rules maintained universal service subsidies
and obligations, and a set of restrictions from the 1984 consent decree limited
the RBOCs' permitted lines of business to ensure their monopoly power did not
extend beyond local exchange service. 36 This situation held without significant
change until the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
B. Regulation Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Congress designed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to dismantle
exclusive local-exchange franchises. 37 In important respects, however, the 1996
29 North Carolina Utils. Comm'n. v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 793 (4th Cir. 1976).
30 Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 MHz, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959).
31 Glen Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517, 523 (1988).
32 See id. at 527-34.
33 BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 641.
34 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 141 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
35 Other local incumbents included the many small, and few larger (e.g., GTE and SNET),
independent phone companies that had coexisted with AT&T (generally by serving areas AT&T had
chosen not to enter).
36 Id. at 224.
37 BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 715.
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Act did less to remove monopoly regulation than to create new rules with the
apparent intention of fostering conditions that would allow the gradual
deregulation of local telecommunications over time. These new rules are
known collectively as the Act's local competition provisions.
The most fundamental of the local competition provisions is the duty of
every telecommunications carrier "to interconnect directly or indirectly with
the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers."38 Such
interconnection prevents any incumbent carrier from creating a barrier to entry
for new entrants or other carriers by refusing to deliver another carrier's calls to
the incumbent's customers, and vice versa. Congress moreover barred the
incumbents from accomplishing the same thing through the pricing of
interconnection, requiring that telecommunications carriers interconnect at
incremental cost for the purpose of originating and terminating each other's
traffic.
39
Second, the Act requires incumbent local exchange carriers to allow
competitors to use parts of the incumbents' own networks to provide competing
service. 40 Thus, if new entrants would be competitively "impaired" without
41access to, say, the incumbents' central-office switches, the Act grants them
access to the incumbents' switches on an "unbundled" (i.e., standalone) basis
and at cost-based rates. This section is known as the 1996 Act's "network
unbundling" provision and the parts of the incumbent networks to which it
provides competitors access are known as "unbundled network elements," or
"UNEs." Mandatory unbundling may apply to any network element to which
access is "technically feasible."
Third, the Act also creates the possibility for new entrants to enter a local
exchange market with no facilities at all of its own. The Act's "resale"
provision requires incumbent local carriers to sell their service wholesale, at
regulated rates, to new carriers that wish to enter the market as resellers of the
incumbent's service.
42
The 1996 Act did take two important steps whose deregulatory impact
was immediate. First, the Act eliminated state monopoly franchises as a matter
of law, so that new competitors no longer faced any significant legal barriers to
providing local telephone service.43 Given the decades of state-protected
monopoly franchises enjoyed by local exchange incumbents, this federal
preemption is significant and averts the need for a would-be entrant to go from
state-to-state to gain such entry rights on a piecemeal basis. Second, the Act
38 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2000).
39 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (2000).
40 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000).
41 Switches are the computers that route calls to and from subscribers.
42 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (2000).
43 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000).
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provided for removal of the line-of-business restrictions on incumbent local
exchange companies, which had been in place since 1984. The Act freed the
RBOCs to offer information services (although initially only through a separate
subsidiary), 44 and allowed the RBOCs to provide long-distance service
conditional on their compliance with the 1996 Act's local competition
• • 45
provisions.
The Act thus combined deregulatory measures with an elaborate new set
of network access and wholesale pricing regulations for the local carriers. It
also left in place retail price regulation and expanded universal service
policies. 46 The 1996 Act can usefully be thought of as scaffolding put in place
to support the construction of a competitive telecommunications market. In this
respect the 1996 Act was part of an emerging transformation in policy toward
regulated industries in which regulators shifted focus from rules designed to
control monopoly behavior to rules designed to foster the introduction of
competition that would uproot the monopoly altogether and, in turn, obviate the
need for costly economic regulation in the future.4 7 Although the 1996 Act sets
no date for any of its local competition rules to expire, it allows the FCC to
require unbundling only if market conditions are such that a new entrant would
be competitively impaired without access to a given UNE.48 The FCC has
interpreted this provision as requiring periodic review and modification of its
unbundling rules.4 9 The Act thus implicitly provides for some evolution in the
scope of its local competition rules as markets become more competitive. As
the next Section will explain, however, the unbundling rules themselves, like
other forms of telecommunications regulation discussed above, are nonetheless
premised on the existence of monopoly in the provision of local
telecommunications services.
C. The Monopoly Assumptions of Regulation
The rationale for the kinds of regulation discussed above depends largely
on the monopoly structure of the local telephone market. First, consider rate
regulation. The government does not regulate prices of the vast majority of
goods and services sold in the United States. It instead leaves market
competition to determine firms' prices, product quality, and output levels.
Actual or potential rivalry from other firms drives any given firm away from
the high monopoly price level that exists in the absence of competition and thus
44 47 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).
45 Id.
46 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(d), 254(a), (b) (2000).
47 See Joseph Keamey & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
48 47 U.S.C. § 251(d) (2000).
49 Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
16 F.C.C.R. 22,781 (Dec. 20, 2001) (known as the IJNE "triennial review" proceeding).
Vol. 24:1, 2007
Telecommunications Policy
eliminates the need for government to step in to protect consumers from market
power.
Even in markets dominated by a single firm, the government generally
does not regulate that firm's economic conduct. Abbot Laboratories is the only
producer of a key protease-inhibitor booster for HIV treatment, yet the
government does not control how much Abbot charges for the drug. 5° Only one
organization offers the standardized LSAT test that law school applicants must
take, yet that organization is free to set its own terms; 51 and the Phillies are the
only major professional sports team in Philadelphia during the summer months
but government does not limit the team's ticket prices. Indeed, the examples of
unregulated monopolies or dominant firms are numerous and diverse and can
be found in industries from entertainment to pharmaceuticals. The government
leaves such firms alone for several sound policy reasons, perhaps the most
prominent of which is captured by Judge Learned Hand's classic statement in
United States v. ALCOA that "[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, should not be turned upon when he wins." 52 The context of ALCOA
was punishment of monopoly through the antitrust laws, but the rationale
applies equally to regulation of monopoly. Even where monopoly exists,
government should use price regulation sparingly because regulation has
harmful incentive effects that can impede the development of competition.
Government-imposed price limits may diminish incentives for the incumbents
or potential challengers to innovate, reduce profit opportunities that attract new
entrants, and ultimately entrench both a particular provider and a particular
technology in the market, to the detriment of consumers.
In most cases, therefore, legislatures and competition authorities leave the
erosion of monopoly power to the process of competitive entry or consumer
substitution over time. Government only steps in to regulate prices of those few
monopolies in which competitive entry is considered either impossible or
undesirable, typically on the theory that the market is a "natural monopoly."
53
To be sure, the government intervenes in markets more frequently through
application of antitrust laws and competition policies that block anticompetitive
efforts by firms to gain or maintain market power.54 But enforcement to stop
behavior on a case-by-case basis after it has proven harmful (ex post
intervention) is very different in purpose and effect from a broad rule that
50 U.S. Refuses to Intervene on AIDS Drug Price, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,2004, at A16.
51 See generally http://www.lsac.org.
52 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
53 A "natural monopoly" occurs when a firm's costs-per-consumer decline over the entire
range of demand such that entry of a second provider would raise the average cost of serving customers
in the relevant market.
54 For an illustration, see the list of cases antitrust cases that the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice has filed over the past decade at Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Antitrust Case Filings, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
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establishes what firms can and cannot do in advance of specific conduct and
regardless of the competitive effect of that conduct in a specific instance (ex
ante regulation).
Universal service regulation was also tied to the monopoly structure of the
local telephone market, although more in its form than in its purpose. Funding
universal service through implicit subsidy flows by which profits from serving
some customers pay for losses from serving others is hard to rationalize or
sustain outside the monopoly context. Competition is the enemy of such "cross-
subsidies" because new entrants rationally target low-cost, high-profit
customers and avoid the high-cost, low-profit (or negative-margin) customers,
thereby diminishing the revenues on which the implicit cross-subsidy flows
depend. Direct subsidies, however, do not necessarily fail or lose their policy
rationale when a market becomes competitive. Regulators may aim subsidies
directly at high costs where they exist, and need not require that firms get
necessary universal service funds indirectly from profits earned elsewhere.
Competition immediately reduces profits but may only slowly reduce costs so,
as markets change, a more direct subsidy mechanism is essential. Direct
subsidies for particular consumers therefore exist in many markets, such as
housing, food, and education, where providers may not have much market
power but where prices may still be too high for some consumers to have
access.
55
Accordingly, even in a competitive market, state or federal policymakers
might continue to find it socially undesirable for rural telephone customers to
pay rates that cover their full, high costs of service. If this is the case,
government could, for example, directly subsidize the carriers providing
service to those consumers by telling competing phone companies that a
particular subsidy amount could be claimed by any carrier serving a particular
customer. The carriers would then compete to provide the lowest rate that
attracts the customer and is profitable in combination with the subsidy.
Alternatively, carriers could bid for the subsidy itself with the lowest bidder
receiving the subsidy for serving the area at issue.5 6 The key point is that it is
the funding mechanism for universal service, not the underlying policy, that
must change in response to competition. So, a distributional policy for
telecommunications that accomplishes universal service objectives is not tied to
monopoly; but a mechanism for achieving those policies that applies only to a
particular firm or set of firms, and that depends on implicit subsidy flows, is
tied to monopoly market structure.
55 See, e.g., Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-36 (2000); National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §
1701 (2000) (providing mortgage subsidies); 20 U.S.C. § 1018 (2000) (governing delivery of financial
assistance to students pursuing higher education).
56 See, e.g., Paul Milgrom, Lecture at the Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., Procuring Universal




Finally, some means of regulating monopoly scope are also closely tied to
single-firm market structure and lose much of their basis as competition
emerges. At the most obvious level, once a firm has rivals it no longer has any
monopoly to extend. In a competitive market, a firm's efforts to bundle
products and services in a way that harms consumers will be disciplined by the
rival offerings of the firm's competitors. Consider a tariff that required any
phone service customer also to rent its telephone from the carrier. If that
packaging somehow allowed the carrier to provide either the phone or the
service at particularly low cost to customers, then customers would gain from
the package. But if the bundle were just a way for the carrier to gain extra
profits, under competitive conditions consumers would turn to other carriers
that either offer a cheaper bundle or do not require consumers to buy a bundle
at all. Similarly, restrictions on the lines of business a firm can enter make
economic sense only if the firm has market power over some essential input-
for example, "bottleneck" access to the local exchange-that allows extension
of power in one market into another market. Such leveraging of the local
network bottleneck into market power over long distance was part of the theory
behind the break-up of AT&T and the imposition of line-of-business
restrictions on the RBOCs.57 As alternative paths into the local exchange arise
through competition, control over bottleneck facilities diminishes and along
with it so does the premise for ex ante restrictions on a firm's entry into
adjacent markets.
Defining the relevant market is an important step in determining whether
an apparent bottleneck actually confers market power. A network might control
access to its own facilities, but unless its facilities are the only option for
reaching the consumer the bottleneck does not confer monopoly power. A
bridge across a river is not a powerful bottleneck if there is another bridge just
downstream. Similarly, a telecommunications network does not control access
to, or communication among, subscribers if subscribers can both reach out and
be reached over an alternative network; a cable system operator cannot control
the flow of programming to subscribers if those subscribers can get the same
programs via satellite; and a railroad cannot regulate the flow of goods to a
market if those same goods can travel on trucks. Therefore, "bottlenecks" that
might appear to exist when markets are defined narrowly in terms of their
underlying technologies do not confer market power or provide a basis for
regulation if alternative technologies provide economically feasible substitutes.
57 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 170-74 (D.D.C. 1982), afJTd sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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D. Monopoly and the Rationale for the 1996 Act
The interconnection and network unbundling/wholesale pricing provisions
of the 1996 Act facilitate competitive entry into the local exchange market. The
two sets of provisions differ in one critical respect, however. The rationale for
mandating interconnection for the exchange of traffic is not necessarily tied to
the monopoly structure of the local telephone market; the network unbundling
and wholesale pricing rules, on the other hand, are premised on the existence of
local exchange monopolies.
To see the difference, consider first interconnection. Imagine that a new
entrant were to build a complete telephone network to compete with the
incumbent. Immediately upon completion of the new network, the incumbent
would no longer have a monopoly over facilities but would still have a
monopoly over customers. The incumbent could maintain that monopoly
simply by refusing to transmit calls to its subscribers if those calls originated
with a subscriber of the new network. The first prospective customer of the new
network would be unable to make any local calls, making the new entrant's
service nearly worthless. Even if the new carrier could sign up a few customers,
few additional subscribers would switch from the incumbent because of the
greater "network benefit" the incumbent offers.
A network benefit is the increase in value of a product or service that
arises as more people use the product or service. Of course, most products do
not produce a network benefit. I do not benefit directly because others like the
same kind of pizza or ride the same brand of bicycle. But telephone service is
one of a small set of products whose value to every individual consumer
increases with the number of additional consumers of the same product. The
more subscribers there are the more people any individual subscriber can call
and the more valuable the service is. Absent interconnection, a firm leading in
market share can use its larger network benefit to attract customers and
disadvantage smaller rivals. Interconnection not only erodes monopoly power,
but preserves competition and prevents an industry from "tipping" back to a
dominant-firm structure every time one competitor gains a market lead and,
hence, a larger network externality that it can exploit to attract consumers.
Interconnection ensures all firms compete to offer a common network benefit
rather than to leverage a proprietary one into increased market power.
Interconnection obligations therefore apply to all telecommunications carriers
in the market, not just perceived monopolists.59
58 For helpful discussions of network effects, see Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer,
Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (M. Armstrong & R. Porter eds., forthcoming), available at
www.paulklemperer.org; Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
59 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1) (2000).
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In contrast, consider the 1996 Act's network unbundling provisions. The
soundness of those rules depends on the assumption that, absent access to the
incumbent's facilities, new entrants will not be able to offer service to
customers in the first place.60 This assumption is only valid if incumbents have
both an economic scale that imposes a barrier to entry and a monopoly over the
facilities new entrants could lease to overcome that entry barrier. Those
conditions would not hold if the incumbent faced competition from other
carriers providing services that consumers could effectively substitute for
conventional local exchange service-in other words, they would not hold
under competition. For example, competition would show both that entry
barriers were not so high that they prevented competition against the
incumbent, and that potential entrants could use other sources or types of
facilities to set up their service offerings. Such entry would more fundamentally
undermine the notion that network access rules are needed to foster
competition. Thus, the 1996 Act's unbundling rules depend both for their
purpose and their structure on the existence of monopoly in the local
telecommunications market. Consistent with that logic, they apply only to
incumbent local exchange carriers and not to all providers (as the
interconnection rules do).6' The same argument applies to the wholesale pricing
provisions of the 1996 Act.
62
The regulatory paradigm embedded in the most recent major
telecommunications legislation is therefore, like that which came before it,
premised on assumptions of underlying monopoly power. Yet, although the
underlying law and its associated regulatory approach have not changed since
1996, the U.S. telecommunications market has, and significantly so. The next
Part will address how the underlying structure of the telecommunications
market has changed, and Part III will then examine the consequences of those
changes for U.S. telecommunications policy.
II. U.S. Telecommunications Since 1996: A Market Transformed
The discussion so far has examined the conventional objectives and
justifications for telecommunications regulation and has explained how those
objectives and the benefits of regulation depend to varying extents on the
existence of a monopolistic market structure. This Part of the Article examines
how the structure of the local telecommunications market has changed since
Congress passed the 1996 Act and argues that the premise of local monopoly,
although valid in 1996, is no longer so today.
60 BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 717-18 (explaining the local competition provisions as
enabling entry where otherwise it might not be in competitors' economic interests).
61 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000).
62 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (2000).
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What has changed? Most fundamentally, the menu of telecommunications
services available to consumers has expanded dramatically in the last ten years.
This expanding menu has, in turn, transformed how consumers communicate
and what they demand in terms of telecommunications options. To highlight
the change, it is worth recalling the choices available to a typical customer in
1996. At that time, one person wishing to communicate a message to another
had four potential choices: (1) pick up the telephone, (2) send a letter by mail,
(3) place a wireless call by cell phone, or (4) log onto a computer and send an
email. In reality, however, the vast majority of American consumers only used
options (1) and (2). For, while roughly 95% of households had conventional
land-line telephone service in 1996, only 44 million subscribers had wireless
telephones, less than 40% of households owned personal computers, and less
than 19% of households had Internet access.
63
By 2003-04, the years for which the most comprehensive data was
available as this Article went to press, the telecommunications landscape had
changed remarkably. The most important overall phenomenon has been the
evidence that consumers now see alternative modes of communication as
substitutes for each other. Such "inter-modal" competition is reflected by
several measures of how people consume telecommunications services.
A. Wireless Telephone Service
The most dramatic change in U.S. telecommunications has been the rise in
wireless telephone usage in the years since Congress passed the 1996 Act. At
the end of 1996 there were 44 million wireless subscribers in the United States
and they used their phones to talk for an average of 125 minutes per month.
64
By the end of 2004, there were 185 million wireless subscribers in the United
States who used their phones to talk for an average of 580 minutes per month.65
Today there are more wireless subscriptions than conventional landline
telephone subscriptions in the United States. 66 Moreover, wireless subscribers
pay less now than they did at the time of the 1996 Act's passage. Wireless bills
fell by 34% from 1997 to 2004 even with the dramatically increasing usage.
67
Competition in the mobile wireless market continues to drive operators to
attract customers through price and non-price means. 68 There are currently fourfacilities-based, nationwide wireless carriers operating in the United States.69
63 FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, 11 -3 tbl. 11.1, 16-3 tbl. 16.1 & 2-10 chart 2.9 (2005),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-State-Link/IAD/trend605.pdf
[hereinafter TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005].
64 Id. at 11-3 tbl.11.1 & 11-6 tbl. 11.3.
65 TENTH CMRS REPORT, supra note 1, 5.
66 TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005, supra note 63, at 7-3 tbl.7. 1.
67 TENTH CMRS REPORT, supra note 1, 157.
68 Id. 101-08.
69 Id. 25 (listing five carriers, but Sprint and Nextel have since merged).
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Almost all U.S. consumers (97% of the population) have access to service from
three or more wireless competitors.
70
There are a number of reasons to believe that wireless service is
increasingly coming to substitute for conventional, local telephone service.
First, the FCC has found that 62% of all Americans, and over 90% of those
between 20 and 49 years old, own cell phones.7 1 As already mentioned, those
subscribers have been using their wireless phones for an increasing number
(580) of minutes per month. This increase has been accompanied by a marked
decline in the amount of landline calling consumers have been doing. In 1996
American consumers made an average of 143 minutes of long-distance calls
72
per month; by 2003 that figure had fallen to 71 minutes. In 1996 Americans
placed 504 billion conventional local telephone calls; in 2003 the number had
dropped to 425 billion.73 The inference of wireless substitution for wireline
service is strong, and is corroborated by other data. The FCC has reported that
5.5% of Americans live in wireless-only households, a figure that rises to 14%
for 18 to 24 year-olds. 74 Yet such figures understate the true degree of
substitution. As the Commission has found, "[e]ven when not 'cutting the cord'
completely, consumers appear increasingly to choose wireless service over
traditional wireline service, particularly for certain uses."75 The Commission
went on to cite data that one third of all households receive more than half of
their calls wirelessly and 9% of households receive almost all their phone calls
on their wireless phones.
76
Not surprisingly, the rise of wireless telephone service has put heavy
pressure on traditional telephone service. Not only have the number of calls and
minutes on the landline networks declined, but the number of traditional phone
lines itself has also dropped, and quickly. FCC data show that by each of three
different measures of line count, the number of conventional telephone lines
fell from 2000 through 2003 (the year of the latest available annual data).77 The
trend appears to be continuing, as the number of landlines dropped at a
quarterly rate of 1.2% in the second and third quarters of 2004.
78
The degree of direct substitution of wireless for wireline telephony
understates the competitive significance of wireless service. The average
American consumer is comfortable with, and equipped with, wireless service.
While most people may continue to subscribe to wireline service, conventional
70 Id. 2.
71 Id. 195.
72 TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005, supra note 63, at 14-3 tbl. 14.2.
73 Id. at 10-4, tbl.10.2.
74 TENTH CMRS REPORT, supra note 1, T 196.
75 Id. 197.
76 Id.
77 TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005, supra note 63, at 7-3 tbl.7. 1.
78 TENTH CMRS REPORT, supra note 1, 197.
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local service providers likely have no power to cut the quality or raise the price
of their service; to do so would be to invite consumers to pick up their mobile
phones more often or simply to cut their landline subscriptions. With at least
three wireless competitors vying for the business of nearly every person in the
United States, consumers without wireless service could easily get it should
they be dissatisfied with their conventional provider. The Pew Internet and
American Life Project found that by 2003, 21% of all American wireless phone
users had already considered canceling their conventional home telephone
service. 79 With so many consumers so close to the margin about keeping their
conventional telephone service, and with wireless service now even more
prevalent among individuals than landline service, the once-powerful local
telephone incumbents have little ability to exercise market power over local
telecommunications. That ability to wield market power is further diminished
in light of other competitive alternatives.
B. Internet-Based Alternatives to Conventional Telephony
Consider next Internet-based alternatives to conventional telephone calls.
By 2003, the share of households with computers had grown to 61.8% and
those with Internet access to 54.6%.8o Residential customers and people who
worked in small businesses together had nearly 26 million high-speed Internet
access lines by the end of 2003, a figure that leapt to over 35 million lines by
the end of 2004. 81 Importantly, most of these high-speed lines do not involve
wireline telephone networks at all; nearly 60% of high-speed Internet access
takes place over cable networks.
82
American consumers have turned the Internet into a primary platform for
communicating with each other. Whereas, not long ago, real-time, interactive
contact with another person required picking up a telephone, the largest three
on-line "instant messaging" providers, AOL, MSN, and Yahoo, recently
reported having, respectively, 51.6 million, 27.3 million, and 21.9 million
unique, monthly users. 83 Such widespread instant messaging, which requires
only basic (rather than high-speed) Internet access, means that a tremendous
amount of communication is now occurring without the need for a telephone
call. The Nielson data cited above builds on earlier evidence of instant
messaging and email usage. A Pew Internet and American Life Project cites
79 John B. Horrigan, Consumption of Information Goods and Services in the United States, at
vi (2003), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP-info -Consumption.pdf
80 TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005, supra note 63, at 2-10 chart 2.9.
81 FCC, High Speed Services for Internet Access, tbl.3 (2005), available at
http://www.fcc.govABureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/hspd0705.pdf.
82 TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005, supra note 63, at 2-3 tbl.2. 1.
83 Verne Kopytoff & Benjamin Pimentel, Yahoo, Microsoft Link Instant Messages: Users
Will Be Connected by End of June Next Year, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 2005, at C1, available at




survey results showing that over 80 million adult (over 18 years old) consumers
in the U.S. used instant messaging in 2003, and that they did so for an average
of over 300 minutes per month.84 The Stanford Institute for the Quantitative
Study of Society released a study in June 2004 reporting survey data that show
American consumers to use email for an average of over 25 minutes per day.
These data suggest that on-line communications methods have become a
primary means of communication.
The falling price of Internet access has made such modes of
communication accessible to the mass market. So too have the expanding array
of places and devices from which consumers can use the Internet, as well as the
falling price of computers. Nearly all public libraries provide Internet access
and by 2004, most even had broadband access. 85 Consumers can now reach the
Internet through cell phones and an array of small hand-held devices. With
respect to home computer access, from 1996 to 1999 computer prices fell by
over 32% per year in the United States. 86 Since 1999, computer prices have
only continued to fall, dropping over 16% in 2005 alone.
87
Cable-modem Internet service is of particular competitive significance for
incumbent local telecommunications providers for several reasons. First, as
consumers increasingly turn to email and instant messaging as a primary means
of communication, cable operators compete vigorously with the phone
companies and their broadband DSL offerings to attract that traffic. As
mentioned, cable operators have been quite successful in that effort, capturing
the majority of the U.S. residential broadband access market.
88
Second, cable modem competition and broadband penetration more
generally has helped to drive a wedge between voice telephone service and the
physical infrastructure over which it runs. For decades, voice service was
uniquely connected with the underlying telephone network. Some more recent
services like cable telephony (switched telephone service running over cable
plant) similarly require the service provider to own, or purchase access to, a
physical network to provide voice service. With the rise of broadband Internet
access, however, a set of voice communication providers has arisen that owns
no network infrastructure at all and instead provides voice service as an
application that consumers can reach over the Internet. Such voice-over-
Internet-protocol (VolP) services, like wireless providers, provide a voice
84 Eulynn Shiu & Amanda Lenhart, How Americans Use Instant Messaging 6 (2004),
available at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPInstantmessage-Report.pdf.
85 See INFORMATION USE MANAGEMENT AND POLICY INSTITUTE, PUBLIC LIBRARIES AND
THE INTERNET (2005), http://www.ii.fsu.edu/plintemet-findings.cfm.
86 Dale W. Jorgensen, U.S. Economic Growth in the Information Age, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH.
ONLINE EDITION, Fall 2001, at tbl. 1.
87 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: OCTOBER 2005 (2005),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpiIl 1162005.pdf.
88 TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005, supra note 63, at 2-3 tbl. 2.1.
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option that does not always, but can and often does, entirely bypass the
incumbent local telephone networks.
The technology for VolP is improving rapidly and use is rising
accordingly. A range of services, from free computer-to-computer calling to
more sophisticated offerings that operate over conventional handsets are
available. Projections show that within a few years 20 million households will
have use of VolP without any conventional telephone connection. But, as the
mainstream press has recently chronicled, the services are already available to
those who want them and VoIP may take off much more quickly than
anticipated. 89 With computers having become inexpensive and ubiquitous, with
competing ways to get broadband access, and with the separation of voice
service from physical infrastructure through VolP offerings, consumers have
yet another option in addition to wireless for working around conventional
local telephone service.
C. New Wireline Telephone Competitors
The incumbent local telephone companies face not only competition from
other modes of communication, but also from new landline telephone
providers. In 1999, competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) that entered
the market as a result of the 1996 Act served only about 8 million lines-4.3%
of the local exchange market.90 By December 2004 that figure had increased to
nearly 33 million lines-18.5% of the local exchange market. 91 Over the same
period, the incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs, the former monopolies)
saw their aggregate line count fall from roughly 181 million to 145 million,
partly as a result of competition from CLECs. 92 The change in ILEC market
share is reflected in revenues, with ILECs falling from 94% to 85% of local
telephone revenues from 1999 to 2003 as CLECs took the corresponding
share. 93 The FCC reports that about 97% of U.S. households reside in zip
codes served by at least one CLEC.94 Even though the telecommunications
market has grown significantly in recent years with the rise of the Internet,
local service revenues for the ILECs have remained flat in nominal terms-and
hence declined in real terms. ILECs altogether had local service revenues of
about $103 billion in 1999 and about $104 billion in 2003; and their overall
(including, e.g., long-distance service) revenues declined from $112 billion to
89 Thomas J. Fitzgerald, How to Make Phone Calls Without a Telephone, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 2005, at C9.
90 FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004, tbl.1 (2005)
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-Cai-ier/Reports/FCC-State Link/IAD/comO7O5.pdf
[hereinafter JULY 2005 LOCAL COMPETITION REPORT].
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005, supra note 63, at 8-11 tbl.8.7.
94 JULY 2005 LOCAL COMPETITION REPORT supra note 90, at 4.
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$109 billion over that same period.95 Indeed, the consumer price index (CPI)
for telecommunications services declined by 0.1% from 1994 to 2004,
compared with CPI increase for all goods of 2.5% over that same period.
96
The story of competing landline carriers--"intramodal" competition-is a
bit more complicated than that of intermodal (i.e., wireless and Internet)
competition because of the fact that some degree of CLEC entry depends on
ILEC facilities to which CLECs gain access pursuant to the UNE provisions of
the 1996 Act. Competition coming solely over CLEC-owned facilities is less
than that reported above: CLECs served about 26% of their customers entirely
over their own facilities at the end of 2004 and depended on undbundled
network elements (see supra Section I.B) to serve 58% (the remainder being
resale of ILEC services). 97 But one cannot conclude from this data that CLEC
competition is weak. Facilities-based telephone competition may seem
comparatively low partly because regulation has made an attractive alternative
available. The FCC itself concluded that the model by which many states
calculated UNE prices may well have distorted the entry path chosen by
CLECs and biased them toward UNE-based, as opposed to facilities-based,
competition. 98 Indeed, facilities-based entry appears to be on the rise as UNE
availability decreases in the wake of recent FCC unbundling decisions;
suggesting that CLECs are economically capable of providing more facilities-
based service than they have chosen to provide given the option of UNEs.
9 9
The most important thing to keep in mind, however, is that it is not up to
CLECs alone, or even primarily, to impose competitive discipline on the
ILECs. The 1996 Act may have seen CLECs as the main hope for local
competition, but intermodal competition from wireless and Internet based
telecommunications are providing even greater challenges to the former
telephone monopolies. The combination of inter- and intramodal competition
have greatly diminished the prospects for any exercise of market power by the
ILECs.
D. Other Competing Technologies
Other technologies are on the horizon. Broadband over power lines,
wireless Internet access, and satellite services are developing to different
degrees and may soon make significant inroads. These technologies are not
speculative; all that is in question is the extent to which they will affect
95 TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005, supra note 63, at 8-11 tbl.8.7.
96 Id. at 12-3 tbl.12.1.
97 JULY 2005 LOCAL COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 90, at tbl.3.
98 Review of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements
and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, NPRM, 18 F.C.C.R. 18,945, 18,975
(Sept. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Review of the Commission's Rules].
99 JULY 2005 LOCAL COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 90, at tbl. 3.
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competition in the telecommunications market and the broadband access
market in particular. In 1999, there were 312,000 subscribers to broadband
over fiber or powerline networks; by 2004 that figure had grown to about
698,000.00 Similarly, in 1999 there were about 50,000 satellite or terrestrial
wireless broadband subscribers; by 2004 the figure had increased more than
eightfold to over 420,000.'' These figures will likely increase, particularly as
wireless Internet access networks (commonly called "WiFi" networks)
proliferate across the country and provide alternatives to cable and telephone
networks.
But even putting aside these developments and looking just at services
currently available on a wide scale, the U.S. telecommunications market looks
nothing like the monopoly of a decade ago. The long-distance telephone market
has all but disappeared as a viable line of business, with wireless and on-line
communications providing preferable substitutes for consumers. AT&T, which
a decade ago had just managed to emerge from dominant-firm regulation, has
sold its business units piece by piece and has now seen its brand name taken
over by one of its RBOC progeny. To be sure, consumers still overwhelmingly
subscribe to local telephone service because it is reliable and inexpensive. But
more Americans than have a home wireline phone now also carry a wireless
phone in their pockets. A large number of those consumers also have cable
modem service or are reached by networks that provide it. Under such
circumstances, there is little ability for local exchange carriers to act like the
protected monopolies they once were.
III. Implications of the Empirical Evidence for Telecommunications
Regulation
What do the data imply for telecommunications regulation? Some say that
the increasingly competitive and diverse market illustrated in the previous Part
eliminates the basis for any regulation at all. ° 2 Others say, to the contrary, that
the market has expanded but that the essential market power of incumbent local
telephone monopolies remains unchecked. 10 3 The facts do not solidly or
unambiguously support either position. The market is certainly not perfectly
100 FCC, HIGH SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004,
supra note 81, at tbl.1.
100 TRENDS 1N TELEPHONE SERVICE 2005, supra note 63, at 2-3 tbl.2. 1.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Randolph J. May, Testimony Before the House Energy and Commerce
Committee (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/testimony/060330telecom.pdf#search='randolph%20May%20testimony; Stephen Moore,
Deregulate Telecommunications, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 25, 2005,
http://www.nationalreview.com/moore/moore-conda200502251219.asp.
103 See, e.g., Mark Cooper, Testimony Before the House Energy and Commerce Committee:





competitive and substitution among alternative communications options, while
considerable, is not complete. VolP does not yet offer emergency service
comparable to landline 911 service; wireless quality is still more variable than
conventional wireline quality; and cable service can be disrupted by local
power outages in a way that the circuit-switched local phone service cannot be.
On the other hand, to believe that conventional local carriers possess significant
market power one must provide a good reason to discount the evidence that
local exchange carriers are losing traffic, customers, and revenues to competing
technologies.
This Part will present a more moderate argument: that the data show a
market structure that is sufficiently competitive to undermine the monopoly
rationale for the current regulation of local telephone service. The time is
therefore ripe-indeed, the data suggest overripe-to rethink the necessity,
scope, and approach to telecommunications regulation in the United States. To
make this argument it is not necessary that the telecommunications market be
so competitive that it will perform according to some idealized, textbook model
of perfect competition. Instead, the relevant question is whether continued, ex
ante regulation will improve the functioning of the market compared to what
would result under market-based competition. For the most part, the evidence
shows that the answer is no. First, economic regulation of this imperfectly
competitive market is likely to have significant, unintended costs for
competition and for consumers. Second, no empirical evidence or general
economic principles support the conclusion that the competitive imperfections
will cause the market to perform so poorly for consumers that monopoly
regulation is warranted or likely to improve consumer welfare.
A. Costs and Benefits of Regulation
Part I of this Article discussed how the rationale for the most important
aspects of telecommunications regulation in the United States is tied to the
historic monopoly structure of the industry. This Section examines the costs of
that regulation and discusses why the comparative costs and benefits of
regulating an industry change as the industry moves from monopoly toward
competition. It argues that the benefits of regulation diminish as markets
become competitive, while the costs of regulation remain and even increase as
that transition occurs. Regulatory costs that might result in a net benefit in the
presence of monopoly become less likely to do so as a market moves away
from a single-firm structure.
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Regulators have long recognized the difficulties of price regulation.10 4 A
threshold problem with determining "reasonable" rates for a service is that the
information necessary for the relevant calculations is in the hands of the very
company being regulated. So called "moral hazard" problems thus arise
because a firm can affect a regulatory agency's determination of allowable
rates by manipulating underlying accounting data. 10 5 But even in cases where
regulators can resolve such information asymmetries and obtain accurate cost
data, rate regulation raises several perplexing problems. First, regulators must
divide a firm's costs into three categories: costs that may be passed on to
consumers and on which the firm is allowed to earn a return; costs that may be
passed through to consumers but on which regulators do not allow a return; and
costs that the firm may not pass through at all to consumers. 106 Typically
regulators allow firms a return on investment in capital and assets used to
provide service to customers.10 7 Firms may pass through, but not earn a return
on, expenditures such as tax payments, wages, capital depreciation, and energy
costs. Firms generally may not pass through expenditures or investment costs
that regulators deem "imprudent."
' 108
The last category of costs can be particularly contentious and involve
protracted regulatory proceedings with major impacts even on a firm's recovery
of documented capital expenditures. For example, the California Public
Utilities Commission disallowed over $4 billion of the roughly $5.5 billion that
Pacific Gas & Electric spent on the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant
because it believed that "unreasonable management was to blame for a large
part of this cost overrun." 10 9 While such decisions often protect consumers
from bearing costs that the monopoly could never pass through if it faced
competition, they also involve a delicate balance in which hindsight risks
punishing a firm for decisions that were honest, efficient, and well-reasoned
when made but that later turned out badly.
Putting aside the difficulties of assessing a firm's expenditures for
purposes of determining a "rate base" on which to calculate a firm's allowable
return, regulators face the challenge of how to value that rate base. For many
104 Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 3 F.C.C.R. 3195, 3204-06
(May 23, 1988) (explaining informational and incentive problems with monopoly price regulation); see
also BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 425-29.
105 See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 588 (2d ed. 1990).
106 For a clear explanation of rate-of-return regulation and its mechanics, see Mark A.
Jamison, Rate of Return Regulation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY
(forthcoming), available at http://www.purc.ufl.edu/primary/documents/JamisonRateofRetumRegulat-
ion.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
107 47 U.S.C. § 213 (2000); see also AT&T et al. Charges for Interstate Telephone Service,
64 F.C.C.2d 1, 46-47 (Mar. 1, 1977) (discussing which investments customers should be required to pay
for through their rates).
108 See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873, 2884
(Apr. 17, 1989) (describing an investigation into Bell System's accounting of costs).




years the only approach the Supreme Court found constitutionally valid was to
allow a return on the "fair value" of a utility's assets.' 1° The principle of the
fair value measure is easy to state but difficult to implement. The idea is to
allow return on those investments that have resulted in productive facilities and
to disallow return on investment that has failed to produce beneficial assets for
the firm. Another way to think of this is that the fair value approach asks what
the current market value of the utility would be were it hypothetically to be
sold. The price would be determined solely by the present value of the
productive assets for which a rational buyer would pay. It is those assets on
which the "fair value" approach seeks to base a return.
Unfortunately, arriving at that present-value figure is notoriously
difficult-a "laborious and baffling task" in the words of the Supreme Court."'
The other principal method of valuing the rate base has been to look at the
firm's original financial investment and to allow a return so long as those
investments were prudent at the time they were made. While the courts have
approved such an method,' 12 the approach does not weed out bad investments
with no current economic value and does not adjust the current rate of return
for factors like inflation and changing replacement costs of capital that reflect
the utility's current risks and financial opportunities.
The 1996 Act gave rise to yet a different model of ratemaking for the
purpose of determining the prices competitors should pay for access to the
incumbents' unbundled network elements ("UNEs"). In implementing the
Act's prescription that rates for UNEs be based on cost, the FCC determined
that costs should not be the embedded or historical costs of the network, but
instead the total, forward-looking, incremental costs of providing each element
(the "TELRIC" method; the acronym stands for total, element, long-run,
incremental Costs),113 Properly implemented, this approach requires calculating
the forward-looking economic value of each part ("element") of a network,
which might appear to resemble the fair-value approach with all of its attendant
difficulties. The FCC, however, developed models of a hypothetical, most-
efficient network to generate rates for UNEs instead of using cost data based on
networks actually in place. 1 4 State commissions followed the FCC's lead and
similarly applied a hypothetical, "most-efficient technology" standard to
assessment of network costs. 1
5
Unfortunately, reliance on models instead of actual networks did not ease
the rate-making task, and the FCC ultimately found TELRIC troublesome in
110 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 457 (1898).
IlI Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923).
112 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989); Fed. Power Comm'n v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 605-06 (1942).
113 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (2005).
114 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2000).
115 Review of the Commission's Rules, supra note 98, at 18,948-49.
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three crucial respects. First, the Commission found that "the TELRIC rules
have proven to take a great deal of time and effort to implement.., the drain
on resources for state Commissions and interested parties can be
tremendous." 116 The FCC further observed that "these complicated and time-
consuming proceedings may work to divert scarce resources from carriers that
otherwise would use those resources to compete in local markets."11 7 Second,
the Commission found the costly proceedings to produce inconsistent results:
"for any given carrier there may be significant differences in rates from state to
state, and even from proceeding to proceeding within a state. We are concerned
that such variable results may not reflect genuine cost differences but instead
may be the product of the complexity of the issues, the very general nature of
our rules, and uncertainty about how to apply those rules."'1 8 Finally, the FCC
found that "[t]he lack of predictability in UINE rates is difficult to reconcile
with our desire that UNE prices send correct economic signals."' 
1 9
As the Commission's observation about incorrect economic signals
indicates, the rate-setting function of monopoly regulation is costly not only in
its administrative burdens, but in its effects on economic incentives of market
actors. Consider first the effects on regulated firms. Firms subject to rate-of-
return regulation (also called "cost-of-service" regulation) may have distorted
incentives when it comes to deploying efficient, low-cost production
technology.' If regulated firms receive a guaranteed return calculated as a
percentage above costs, their absolute profits will be higher as their costs rise.
Incentive-based rate programs such as price cap regulation improve the
incentive properties of traditional rate-of-return regulation by allowing firms to
earn extra profits by cutting costs. But even price caps provide weaker
incentives than the unregulated market. As the Supreme Court has observed,
"[t]he price-cap scheme starts with rate generated by the conventional cost-of-
service formula., 121 Moreover, regulators typically adjust price caps downward
over time to reflect industry-wide productivity increases and to share those
productivity gains with consumers. 122 Because the carriers' increased efficiency
in providing service contributes to such productivity gains, carriers ultimately
pay some price for increasing their operating efficiency. Price cap mechanisms
therefore provide less incentive to cut costs than does competition, in which
failure to be efficient means not just losing some profits, but losing customers
altogether to rivals.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 18,949.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1053 (1962); see also Jamison, supra note 106, at 6.
121 Verizon v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 487 (2002).
122 See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 427 (noting that the government has an incentive to
lower price caps over time).
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It is important to note that the harms to efficiency and innovation
discussed above result even if regulators accurately identify the costs of the
regulated firm and provide that firm with a "fair" rate of return. Additional and
potentially more costly problems arise if regulators do not accurately measure
costs and set rates to provide the targeted level of return. The informational and
administrative difficulties of rate regulation suggest that accuracy is unlikely to
be the norm, as the FCC has found to its chagrin in the case of TELRIC pricing
for UNEs. Rate setting mistakes can be costly to consumers and the regulated
firm alike. If regulators set rates too high, then price regulation is not protecting
consumers very well yet is still incurring administrative costs and distorting
incentives. Given that the underlying logic of regulation is generally premised
on the natural monopoly structure of an industry and the potential cost
advantages (or economic inevitability) of a single provider over competition,'
23
rates that regulators set too high raise the question of whether consumers might
not in fact be better off with competition which, though perhaps less efficient
from a cost standpoint, does a better job of disciplining pricing behavior. If, on
the other hand, regulators set prices too low, then the regulated firm may have
trouble attracting the financial investment necessary to maintain, develop, and
deploy capital in the way that best benefits consumers in the long run.'
24
Consider next the potential effects of regulated rates on potential entrants.
The effects of incorrectly regulated rates become particularly acute when a
market is undergoing the transition to competition, especially in industries
characterized by high fixed costs of production. Long-run prices for any good
or service must be high enough for firms to recover their production costs;
when firms must make large, fixed investments in infrastructure to provide
service, then prices must be above marginal cost if firms are to recover their
initial capital outlays. No firm goes into business to lose money, although that
is exactly what would happen if a high-fixed-cost industry had its prices driven
down to the textbook competitive ideal of prices equal to marginal (or average
variable) costs. 125 Perfect competition is therefore the wrong standard for
market performance in high-fixed-cost industries; some margin above
incremental, variable cost is necessary. 126 If regulators set prices so low that
they do not provide an attractive rate of return on total costs, unregulated
competitive entrants will not find the market attractive to enter. The goal of
price regulation is, however, to keep prices low for consumers. If regulators
choose competitive pricing standards inappropriate to the economics of the
industry and, in their efforts to restrain the dominant firm's perceived market
123 See, e.g., VARIAN, supra note 105, at 407-09.
124 Viscusi et al., supra note 106, at 379.
125 See, e.g., VARIAN, supra note 105, at 407.
126 Economists sometimes refer to this idea as "workable" competition to distinguish it from
the textbook ideal of "perfect" competition. See J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable
Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940).
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power force prices too close to marginal costs, regulators risk deterring the
competitive entry that could obviate the need for regulation in the first place.
In a market moving toward competition, then, regulators walk a very fine
line: Regulated prices that are too high can act as focal points around which
market prices cluster. That is, even if the regulated firm has downward pricing
flexibility, prices may be higher than in an unregulated setting if the incumbent
must file tariffs that give advance notice of its intention to lower prices. There
is empirical evidence that AT&T acted as a price leader in the long-distance
telephony market when it was required to file tariffs as a dominant firm. The
principal competitors, MCI and Sprint, knew in advance what AT&T's prices
would be and had incentive to follow just under the "umbrella" of AT&T's
prices rather than aggressively cutting prices themselves.127 Regulated prices
that are too high thus accomplish nothing, except possibly to raise consumer
prices, in a market that would otherwise be naturally moving toward
competition.
Regulated prices that are too low also do harm. Entrants move into
markets where they expect to earn a profit. Regulating the incumbent's rates to
a level below that which provides the return competitors need to attract
investment and profitably enter the market will deter competition and impede
the benefits it would provide to consumers. Regulators thus face a tall order in
markets in which competition is emerging: Set rates at exactly the level that
will allow an efficient firm to attract the investment necessary to compete in the
marketplace. Rates above that level will make consumers worse off than the
unregulated market, rates below that level will deter competition that would
naturally lower prices and obviate the need for administratively costly
regulation. Given the difficulties that regulators inevitably face in setting rates
with such precision (recall the FCC's remarks about TELRIC, supra) one must
be skeptical about the wisdom of importing rate regulation schemes from a
monopoly setting into an emerging competitive environment.
The concerns raised above apply equally to regulation of wholesale or
UNE rates, and equally where regulation addresses non-price dimensions of
service. Consider the case of UNEs. One might argue that regulating wholesale
rates is less risky than regulating retail rates because if UNE prices are too
high, new entrants simply will not buy UNEs; if UNE rates are too low,
entrants will get an extra competitive boost instead of being deterred from
competing. That argument is incorrect, however. If UNE rates are too high then
it is hard to see what policy goals they could serve to be worth the
administrative burden. A mechanism would be in place for access that rational
entrants would not purchase. The problem with UNE rates that are too low is
more severe. As the FCC itself has acknowledged, rates that do not fully
compensate incumbents for the incremental costs of providing UNEs
127 Paul W. MacAvoy, Testing for Competitiveness of Markets for Long Distance Telephone
Services: Competition Finally?, 13 REV. INDUS. ORG. 295, 298, 305 (1998).
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undermine investment incentives and thwart the development of competing
networks. 128 Such low rates deter the incumbent from investing in its network
and deter entrants from building their own networks by providing them with
subsidized use of the incumbent's network. The result is less investment by
incumbents and entrants alike, less innovation, and less price competition over
time for consumers.
Line-of-business restrictions are another form of regulation that imposes
costs on society. Whether such limits are strict, like the restrictions governing
the AT&T divestiture, or whether they govern the structure and terms of entry
into adjacent markets more modestly, as under the 1996 Act, they have the
effect of limiting competition and hence the economic performance of the
market into which regulators control entry. One study, for example, estimates
that the AT&T divestiture's information-services restriction, in delaying the
RBOCs from introducing innovative voice-messaging services, cost society
over $1 billion per-year in consumer welfare. 129 Others have recognized more
generally that even where some government regulation is necessary because
unmonitored entry into markets could allow some firms to cause consumer
harm, restrictions entail a tradeoff because they also reduce competition and
potential innovation.
130
In the case of the AT&T divestiture, one can reasonably debate the
wisdom of the line-of-business restrictions. While the necessity and duration of
the restrictions can be questioned, there is a good case that, at least initially,
they protected the affected markets from potential anticompetitive strategies by
the RBOCs. After divestiture the RBOCs still had substantial control over
access to customers by virtue of their local exchange monopolies, which they
could potentially have exploited to gain market power in complementary
markets. 131 On the other hand, the players in those complementary markets
were strong and experienced-firms like AT&T in long distance telephony and
IBM in information services. Whatever the initial case for limits on lines of
business, the claim that such regulation yields net benefits weakens as the
bottleneck monopoly diminishes with competition. For then society is left with
the costs of reduced competition and innovation without the compensating
benefit of reduced anticompetitive harm.
128 18 F.C.C.R. at 18,947.
129 Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, 1997 BROOKINGS PAPERS IN ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 14-15 (1997).
130 Scott D. Anthony et al., The Policymaker's Dilemma: the Impact of Government
Intervention on Innovation in the Telecommunications Industry (Innosight, Working Paper No. 02-075,
2002), available at http://www.innosight.com/documents/PolicymakersDilemma.pdf.
131 Such monopoly power over local exchanges was the reason behind the line of business
restrictions in the MFJ. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 141 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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The above discussion highlights only some examples of the costs of
regulation in order to show that regulation cannot casually be assumed to be
costless or effective. 132 The discussion also allows one to see that the benefits
of regulation depend in important ways on the existence of an underlying
monopoly. Rates that are set too low in a monopoly do not deter competitors-
competitors do not exist either because they did not arise in a previously
unregulated environment or because regulators determined the industry to be a
natural monopoly in which multiple firms would be inefficient. Regulated rates
that are too high in a monopoly setting may still be better than what the
monopolist would charge unconstrained. Monopoly thus allows regulation to be
imprecise and still create consumer benefits. Under competition, even (or
perhaps especially) emerging competition, regulators have no such margin for
error. The errors and administrative costs that may still be compatible with net
social gains under regulated monopoly become less so as competition develops.
Rather than restraining the even greater harms of monopoly, the regulations
impede the even greater benefits of competition. Regulators must therefore be
extremely wary of "the rather dangerous combination of competition and
regulation"' 33 that comes from allowing regulatory programs designed for
monopoly to carry over into a market making the transition to competition.
B. Oligopoly and Imperfect Competition in Telecommunications
To say that the telecommunications market has transformed from its
former monopoly structure is not to say that the industry will behave in a
"perfectly competitive" fashion or that the rival communications offerings are
perfect substitutes for conventional telephone service. Competition need not be
perfect for deregulation to be socially beneficial. As will be discussed in this
Section, in some cases even concentrated markets ("oligopolies") may perform
well and, more to the point, may perform better unregulated than regulated.
This Section will discuss three reasons why telecommunications markets in
particular may warrant deregulation even as competition is developing and is
still at oligopoly levels. It will then examine the research on the behavior of
firms in concentrated markets to see what economic theory and empirical
evidence show about the performance of oligopolies under conditions that exist
in network industries like telecommunications. The analysis reveals that,
although oligopolies will rarely perform like textbook competitive markets,
they can perform significantly better for consumers than monopolies and can be
harmfully distorted by regulation designed for a monopoly setting.
132 For example, another category of regulatory costs may arise from manipulation of the
regulatory process itself to benefit powerful constituencies. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman et al., The Economic
Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation, 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS IN ECON. ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS 1 (1989).
133 ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE
COMPETITIVE ERA 42 (1991).
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The first reason why the addition of even one or two competitors can
change the dynamics of telecommunications markets to the benefit of
consumers has to do with the cost structure of the industry.
Telecommunications networks have very high, fixed costs, often specific to
particular services and locations. The result is that competitive facilities are
very unlikely to exit the market-once in place they will remain to be used in
competition with the incumbent carriers. If one operator fails, the assets will be
available for another to purchase and deploy, as the exiting firm will not simply
tear up cable, leave spectrum rights unexercised, or throw away switches. As a
result, while it may be possible for an incumbent firm to drive a new operator
from the market, it is much more difficult for the incumbent to drive
competitive assets from the market. Competition is thus likely to be much more
durable in a network industry with sunk costs.
Second, even imperfect substitutes in a differentiated-product market like
telecommunications can be very powerful drivers of competitive behavior
where fixed costs are high compared to the variable costs of service. When a
telephone carrier loses a customer, it loses revenue but does not save much cost
from not serving that customer. The result is that a lost customer is particularly
harmful to a network operator because the operator loses not just the profit it
would earn from the customer, but that customer's contribution to fixed costs
the operator must continue to bear. The lack of a downward adjustment in cost
to offset revenue loss is particularly acute in telecommunications because the
fixed costs of building and maintaining a network are very high while the
marginal costs of serving any customer are very low. The consequence is that
one network's products (say wireless) need not be viewed as substitutes by the
majority of another network's (say an ILEC's) customers for the latter to feel
acute competitive pressure to retain customers.
1 34
Third, one cannot simply assume that because a market is concentrated it
will perform badly. As Professor Alfred Kahn has noted, "concentrated or
oligopolistic markets . . could show widely diverging kinds of
performance."' 135 It is true that competition among only two or three competing
firms generally does not completely eliminate market power or provide an
optimal menu of consumer choices. The telecommunications market today is
not wholly risk-free for consumers. Firms in concentrated markets may have
134 This argument does not imply that network markets with high fixed costs will become
highly competitive (in the sense of price being close to marginal cost) as soon as there is some
competitive entry. In high-fixed-cost markets the textbook competitive equilibrium is unlikely to be
sustainable because firms would lose money by failing to recover fixed costs. Long-run prices will thus
likely reflect average total costs, not the textbook ideal of marginal costs. The argument above does
imply, however, that even limited competition will reduce the ability of the incumbent firm to exercise
market power to achieve abnormally high profit margins above average total costs.
135 Alfred E. Kahn, Economic Justification for TELUS' Two-Facilities Bright-Line
Forbearance Test, Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission Public Notice
2005-2 (June 22, 2005) app. 2 to Comments of TELUS Communications Inc. at 20.
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some degree of power over price, quality, and output. But claims that a
concentrated telecommunications market is one in which consumers are likely
to be made worse off if regulation is reduced, or are likely to suffer harm that
regulation can remedy, should be met with skepticism. There are circumstances
and dimensions in which concentrated markets perform badly and those in
which they perform well. But, as will be discussed below, both economic
theory and empirical evidence suggest that, on dimensions of both pricing and
innovation, today's telecommunications firms perform more like competitors
than like monopolists whose market power requires ex ante restraint. The
analysis further shows that regulation is unlikely to improve on, and may
impede, the benefits of that competition.
1. Basic Oligopoly Models
"Oligopolies" are markets that contain a small number of firms. Such
concentrated markets are usually "imperfectly" competitive: Oligopoly prices
are generally higher than prices that result from perfect competition but lower
than prices that result under monopoly. 36 Firms in oligopolies thus often earn
profits higher than necessary to keep competitive firms in the industry and are
not constrained, as firms facing perfect competition are, to accept passively the
prices dictated to them by the marketplace. The key feature of oligopolies, and
the one that generates higher profits, is that there are few enough firms that
each firm makes price and output decisions knowing its individual decisions
will affect the market and cause responses by other firms. Anticipation of those
competitive responses may cause a firm to rethink what at first looks like a
profit-enhancing move.
Consider a simple example in which two firms compete ("duopoly") to
sell pizzas and each charges $10 per pizza. Suppose one firm determines it
could attract customers from its rival by cutting price to $8. That firm can often
anticipate that its rival will respond with a matching price cut. At the end of the
day, both firms will again share the market, but at $8 of revenue per pizza
instead of $10. Perhaps the lower price will induce people to increase their
consumption of pizzas enough to raise overall profits for each firm even at the
lower price. But absent such a scenario, the prospective price cutter will realize
that its rival's reaction will quickly eliminate the short-run gains and lead to
longer-run reduction in profits for both firms. The resulting equilibrium can be
one in which firms share profits rather than compete to erode them.
The greater the number of competitors in the market, the less likely the
strategic interactions described above. It is harder for large numbers of firms to
136 The basic model of oligopoly can be found in price theory or industrial organization
textbooks. See generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL




keep track of each other's activities; it is less likely that any individual firm's
actions could fundamentally change the market and more likely that some firm
at any given time will be cutting price. Under such vigorous competition, firms
cut prices because if they do not, rivals will, and the firm will lose its market
share; in the simple oligopoly story firms don't cut prices because, if they do,
rivals will and all firms will earn lower profits.
Oligopoly is not, however, a sufficient condition for regulation. This point
is generally recognized in antitrust law, in which concentrated markets raise
only a presumption of poor performance,1 37 a presumption that analysis of
specific circumstances often rebuts even at very high levels of market
concentration (e.g., three firms). 138 The reasons for often finding market
concentration harmless in antitrust apply at least as strongly in the context of
industry-specific policy like telecommunications regulation. First, oligopoly
does not always lead to poor levels of price and output for consumers. Second,
regulated oligopoly may be worse for consumers than unregulated oligopoly.
To see how different the results under oligopoly can be depending on various
assumptions, consider the contrast between the best-known basic models of
concentrated markets, the "Coumot model" and the "Bertrand model," each
named for the 19th century economist who developed it.
In the Cournot model, each firm in the market independently calculates its
own profit-maximizing output level, knowing that its choice will combine with
the output levels of its rivals to determine the market price and what each
firm's profits will be. 139 The market reaches equilibrium when, given every
other firm's output choice, no firm would find it profitable either to raise or
lower its own output level. 140 The equilibrium price in the Cournot model turns
out to be lower than the monopoly price, but higher than the marginal-cost
prices that would exist in a perfectly competitive market. The price that results
from Cournot competition moves closer to marginal costs as the number of
firms in the market increases.
14 1
137 U.S. Dep't of Justice and the FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.5 (1997), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz-book/hmgl .html.
138 John Kwoka, Some Thoughts on Concentration, Market Shares, and Merger Enforcement
Policy, presented at the FTC/DOJ Workshop on Merger Enforcement, Washington, D.C., Feb. 17, 2004,
available at http://www. ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/presentations/040217kwoka.pdf.
139 See AGUSTIN A. COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
THEORY OF WEALTH (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., 1927) (1838). In the Cournot oligopoly model, firms
act independently to maximize their individual profits by strategically choosing production levels, but
each firm is aware that its individual profits also depend on its competitors' choices. Each firm in the
market makes a conjecture (called a "Cournot conjecture") about the other firms' likely production
levels, and from that conjecture determines how much residual market demand will be left for the
individual firm to capture.
140 In modem terminology, the Cournot equilibrium is a type of Nash equilibrium. See
generally CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 136, at 162.
141 See id. at 165; see also id. at 166, Table 6.2.
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In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, firms act independently to maximize
individual profit by strategically choosing their prices (rather than output
levels, as in the Cournot model) but are aware their individual profits will
depend also on the prices their rivals' will choose to set. 142 Because the low-
price firm captures the entire market share, Bertrand firms drop their prices as
low as possible in anticipation of their rivals' price cuts. 14 3 As a result, in
equilibrium, Bertrand firms make zero economic profits (i.e., profits that cover
costs plus the money a firm could have earned by pursuing the next best
alternative business opportunity)-the minimum profit level at which a firm
might be willing to stay in business. 44 This is called the Bertrand paradox-
two firms are enough for perfect competition.1
45
The basic Bertrand and Cournot models incorporate a number of
unrealistic assumptions about consumer demand, firm costs, product
substitutability, and competitive entry. But a comparison of those models is
useful because it shows how differently oligopolies might perform depending
on underlying assumptions, notably on whether firms compete based on price
or output levels. More sophisticated models of oligopoly behavior build in
more realistic assumptions about industry structure, firm costs and consumer
demand, but still reveal a range of outcomes from oligopoly and show
oligopoly to be better than monopoly, even if not near the efficiency of perfect
competition. 146
2. Empirical and Experimental Studies of Oligopoly
Generally, empirical evidence reflects the theoretical predictions that
oligopoly performance will vary depending on underlying conditions. One
study that examines price-cost margins in a range of U.S. manufacturing
industries from 1958 to 1981 finds that outcomes in concentrated industries
resemble Cournot outcomes, meaning performance is neither as poor as that of
monopoly but not as good as perfect competition. 147 A more comprehensive
survey of empirical research on concentrated markets finds similar results and
142 Id. at 166-67.
143 Firms in this model make conjectures (called "Bertrand conjectures") about what their
rivals' prices will be and how those prices might respond to any action the individual firm takes.
Because the basic Bertrand model assumes that consumers consider the goods produced by various firms
to be perfectly substitutable, and assumes that each firm could produce enough of the good at issue for
the entire market at constant marginal cost, the firm that sets the lowest price will receive the entire
market share. Id. at 166-70.
144 Id. at 168.
145 TIROLE, supra note 136, at 210-1I.
146 See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion:
Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719 (2004) (providing a useful
"short course" on oligopoly).
147 See Ian Domowitz et al., Oligopoly Supergames: Some Empirical Evidence on Prices and
Margins, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 379 (1987).
Vol. 24:1, 2007
Telecommunications Policy
demonstrates that performance can vary depending on underlying industry and
consumer factors. 
48
Economic experiments also offer compelling evidence about oligopoly
behavior. 149 Recent experimental studies find that under a wide variety of
conditions oligopolistic competition yields prices and outputs that are better
than monopoly but not as good as perfect competition, and that the
performance of the market increases with the number of firms.' 50 Importantly,
these studies consistently show that as the number of firms in the market
increases beyond two, market performance improves substantially for
consumers. 151
The experimental and empirical evidence provides some explanation for
the data showing that, despite a presumption in the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines that markets with five equal sized players are unhealthily
concentrated, the DOJ and FTC in fact generally allow mergers that reduce the
number of firms in a market from five to four and often from four to three.
52
The evidence that competition becomes notably more vigorous when there is
even just a third firm in the market may explain why merger authorities often
find concentration to three or four firms not to harm consumer welfare. The fact
that merger authorities so find, backed up by the empirical and theoretical
evidence that oligopoly markets may vary widely in their competitive
performance, supports the general point that oligopoly cannot be presumed to
be so anticompetitive as to warrant regulation.
3. Applications of Oligopoly Research to Telecommunications
The telecommunications industry has several specific features that affect
oligopoly performance. Most importantly, telecommunications networks
involve large, fixed costs and low marginal costs of adding new subscribers.
These features have several implications. First, long-run prices in the market
will be above marginal cost even under vigorous competition, because the
textbook result of marginal-cost pricing under perfect competition would fail to
compensate firms for their costs of building their networks. Thus, the presence
148 Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).
149 For an explanation of experimental economics by the economist who received the Nobel
prize for its development, see Vernon Smith, Experimenal Methods in Economics, http://www.ices-
gmu.org/Article.php/370.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
150 Jon Ketcham et al., A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing
Institutions, 51 REv. ECON. STUD. 595, 613 (1984); Jamie Brown Kruse et al., Bertrand-Edgeworth
Competition in Experimental Markets, 62 ECONOMETRICA 343, 363 (1994); Charles R. Plott, Industrial
Organization Theory and Experimental Economics, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 1485, 1516 (1982).
151 Id.; see also Steffen Huck et al., Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in
Experimental Oligopolies, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 435,435-36 (2004).
152 Kwoka, supra note 138.
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of price-cost margins is not the indicator of market power in
telecommunications that it might be in industries with different cost structures.
Second, as mentioned, firms with high fixed costs and low marginal costs
suffer greater economic harm from losing a customer than do other kinds of
firms, because they cannot reduce their costs in proportion to their loss of
revenue. Finally, telecommunications providers must make substantial capacity
commitments in advance of selling service, which affects the firms' decisions
about price and output. Under these circumstances, neither the basic Cournot
nor Bertrand approach captures how telecommunications firms are likely to
behave, although more sophisticated models provide some insight.
For example, professors David Kreps and Jose Scheinkman brought
together elements from both the Cournot and Bertrand models to study a more
realistic model of finn behavior. 153 Kreps and Scheinkman consider two firms
that interact with each other over two stages. In the first stage, each firm makes
a binding choice about its future production capacity; essentially a Cournot
style output decision. In the second stage, each firm chooses price given its
existing production capacity and makes Bertrand conjectures about how its
rival will respond. The predicted results from the Kreps-Scheinkman model are
the same as the basic Cournot model, with the equilibrium price above
marginal cost but below the monopoly price. 154 This approach addresses the
less intuitive Cournot assumption that firms compete in quantity rather than
price but also addresses the less believable Bertrand outcome that firms in a
concentrated industry make zero economic profit. Instead of being two
different models about firms' conjectures and behavior, the Cournot and
Bertrand approaches represent two different stages of a duopolist's competitive
decision-making.
The Kreps-Scheinkman model has particular relevance to network
industries like telecommunications. Decisions about network scope and
capacity must to some degree precede the provision of service. When
telecommunications companies dig up streets to lay bundles of cable, they
make long-run decisions about how much capacity their networks are likely to
need. When wireless companies bid for spectrum in the FCC's periodic
auctions, they are effectively buying blocks of capacity. Neither the
underground (or undersea) cable capacity nor the amount of radio spectrum a
firm has can be easily changed in the short-run. Competition will at least for a
period of time be affected by a capacity decision. If the capacity constraint
proves binding, following a period of decline prices will rise until more
capacity can be added, after which prices will again fall; a phenomenon known
as "Edgeworth cycling" after the economist who first analyzed it.155 If capacity
153 David Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, Quantity Precommitment & Bertrand Competition
Yield Cournot Outcomes, 14 BELL J. ECON. 326 (1983).
154 TIROLE, supra note 136, at 216.
155 CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 136, at 170-72.
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constraints are not binding and existing production capability can serve all
market demand, then the upward part of the Edgeworth cycle may not occur.
Indeed, prices may collapse to marginal cost if capacity is sufficiently
great as the telecommunications sector learned in the late 1990s. Firms in the
1990s made decisions about how much capacity to put into networks,
particularly fiber optic networks designed to carry an expected increase in
global voice and data traffic. Firms predicted, as the Kreps-Sheinkman
approach might suggest, that their capacity would be used to a sufficient level
to support profitable pricing among the handful of market competitors. But then
two things happened: global traffic did not rise to predicted levels, and digital
compression technology allowed a dramatic increase in the amount of data that
a given amount of cable could carry. The result was enormous overcapacity and
a price war among networks to sell idle capacity to telecommunications
customers. Prices tumbled dramatically and in many places have continued to
156do so. This example highlights how, in an oligopoly setting, the cost
structure of an industry and the way it must invest in productive capacity can
greatly affect the performance of a concentrated market.
Empirical studies of telecommunications oligopolies have been limited by
the history of monopoly in the industry and by the fact that, even in the absence
of monopoly, regulation has often constrained market structure and firms'
behavior. That being said, the empirical evidence in telecommunications since
the AT&T divestiture still offers useful insights into oligopoly performance in
the industry.
Professor Paul MacAvoy examined the competitiveness of post-
divestiture long-distance telephony by calculating the price-cost margins of
AT&T, MCI, and Sprint.' 57 Consistent with the theoretical and experimental
predictions that a slight increase in the number of firms will increase
competition, MacAvoy found that long-distance prices between 1987 and 1994
decreased by 50% as the market expanded from one to three suppliers. 58 But
although prices fell, MacAvoy found that price-cost margins nonetheless
persisted for some time. 159 Professor David Newbery found that consumers in
156 See, e.g., Andrew M. Odlyzko, Internet Traffic Growth: Sources and Implications (Univ.
of Minn. Working Paper, 2003), available at
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/itcom.internet.growth.pdf (discussing low internet transport
prices in wake of cutthroat competition resulting from overinvestment in infrastructure); Jason Kowal,
Carrier's Pricing Projections: What is Happening to the Transcontinental Bandwidth Market, and at
What Price?, ITU TELECOM AsIA 04, Sept. 9, 2004,
http://www.itudaily.com/new/home.asp?Articleid=4090903 (showing large drops in capacity prices
between Europe and Asia and within Asia in 2004).
157 MACAvoY, supra note 2; MacAvoy, supra note 127; Simam K. Kahai et al., Is the
"Dominant Firm" Dominant? An Empirical Analysis ofAT&T's Market Power, 39 J.L. & ECON. 499
(1996).
158 MACAVOY, supra note 2, at 77.
159 MacAvoy, supra note 127, at 299.
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the U.K. experienced a similar drop in long-distance prices in the ten years
after regulators opened the market.'
1 60
Studies of the wireless communications market tell a similar story. The
FCC authorized cellular telephony in late 1983 by granting spectrum licenses to
two firms in any geographic region.' 61 A study by Phillip Parker and Lars-
Henrik Roller found that the duopoly policy led to prices above marginal cost
but that the duopoly pricing was much better than monopoly.162 Empirical data
show that as wireless telephony became more competitive with entry by new
firms in the 1990s, prices fell and output expanded dramatically even while the
market remained an oligopoly.' 
63
Both the long-distance and wireless studies show telecommunications
oligopolies to have performed much better than the monopolies for which
regulation arose. While the industry did not perform like a textbook
competitive market, the important question is not how oligopoly compares to
perfect markets, but whether regulation improves oligopoly performance. On
this point, even while MacAvoy is critical of the excess profits he finds to have
persisted for some time under the long-distance oligopoly, he argues that the
regulatory scheme itself, under which the FCC required the three main
competitors to file tariffs, effectively facilitated collusive behavior among the
firms. 164 Other studies of long-distance pricing support MacAvoy's argument
that deregulation was more beneficial than continued regulation in that
market. 165 In the case of the wireless industry, Parker and Roller similarly
found that price regulation actually tended to increase prices charged by
wireless providers. 166 A study of the British telecommunications industry also
concluded that regulatory oversight had harmful effects on emerging
competition and on market performance. 1
67
The comparative performance benefits of oligopoly over monopoly for
technological innovation also has empirical support. It is well established in the
economic and competition policy literature that the link between market
structure and innovation is much less predictable or systematic than the link
160 DAVID M. NEWBERY, PRIVATIZATION, RESTRUCTURING, AND REGULATION OF NETWORK
UTILITIES 324-25 (1999).
161 Philip M. Parker & Lars-Henrik Roller, Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket
Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry, 28 RAND J. ECON. 304 (1997).
162 Parker & Roller, supra note 161, at 305.
163 See supra Section I1A.
164 MacAvoy, supra note 127, at 298-99.
165 See CRANDALL, supra note 133, at 41-42, 72; Yu Hsing, Impacts of Deregulation and
Price Caps on Rate Converge between Washington DC and Eight Major Cities: A Pooled Data Model, 7
INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 135, 136 (1995); Eli M. Noam, Assessing the Impacts of Divestiture and
Deregulation in Telecommunications, 59 S. ECON. J. 438, 443-46 (1993); Clifford Winston, Economic
Deregulation: Days ofReckoningfor Microeconomists, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1263, 1286 (1993).
166 See Parker & Roller, supra note 161, at 320.




between market structure and prices.168 But there is reasonably good evidence
that neither monopoly nor perfect competition is particularly beneficial for
investment in research and development or deployment of new technology.
169
Concentrated markets that lie between those polar cases provide a potentially
valuable balance between competitive pressure to innovate and pressure to
invest in R&D, and there is evidence that concentrated markets at least
outperform monopoly when it comes to innovation. 17 In the particular case of
telecommunications, new technology has been deployed much faster when
there are two or three firms in the market than under monopoly.17 1 Such new
technologies are likely to have two effects: first, to provide better
telecommunications services to consumers; and second, to feed the competitive
forces that restrain prices as new products provide substitute consumer goods
that erode the market power of incumbents.
The performance of concentrated markets thus has multiple dimensions
and depends on several conditions, and telecommunications services possess
characteristics which suggest that even modest rivalry can yield results that are
quite competitive. A high ratio of fixed to marginal costs makes even partial
substitutes potent motivators of competitive behavior. The fact that
telecommunications networks are high capacity and have low marginal costs of
adding consumers raise the probability that providers will compete through
prices rather than restrain supply in an effort to keep prices high. The key point,
however, is that regulation in such a setting is unlikely to improve pricing and
may well interfere with competition. Advance tariff filing, for example, may
help to stabilize high prices by removing the threat of surprise price cuts that
benefit consumers and keep downward pressure on prices. Asymmetrically
applied service standards and requirements may have similar effects. Moreover,
especially in a market in which technology is advancing and investment in new
technology is important, any regulation that got prices wrong by trying to push
margins to the "perfectly" competitive level would risk deterring investment
and competitive entry. In the light of increasing competition in
telecommunications, the potential benefits of such regulation are in turn quite
low.
168 See, e.g., Michael Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 20-25), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?-
abstractid=894346.
169 Id.
170 Id.; Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9269, 2002).
171 See Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S.
Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 116 (2000).
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C. Precedent and History Support a Deregulatory Shift
History supports shifting sooner rather than later to a less rule-based
telecommunications policy. First, there is precedent for deregulating markets
whose structure is similar to that currently found in "local"
telecommunications. Second, there is evidence that past delays in deregulation
in a variety of industries have been costly to American consumers. This Section
will discuss the relevant precedent and historical evidence.
The FCC and Congress have on several occasions made decisions about
whether to impose or maintain regulation in concentrated markets. On three
important occasions the Commission or Congress decided to forebear from
regulating in circumstances generally less competitive than the local
telecommunications market is today. These three occasions involved the
provision for removal of cable price regulation in 1992, the deregulation of
wireless communications in the mid 1990s, and the removal of dominant-firm
regulation from AT&T in 1995.
In the case of cable television, Congress passed the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (1992 Cable Act) in
response to public outcry about the rise in cable rates over the preceding years.
The 1992 Cable Act granted local franchising bodies, in conjunction with the
FCC, authority to regulate cable rates as long as the cable system at issue was
not subject to "effective competition." 172 Of interest for current purposes is that
the Act went on to define competition as "effective" if: (i) fewer than 30% of
households in the franchise area subscribe to a cable system's cable service; or
(ii) the franchise area is served by at least two unaffiliated subscription video
providers each of which offers service to at least 50% of households in the area,
and the smaller of the two providers has at least a 15% market share. 173 If
applied to today's telecommunications market those standards would result in
deregulation of most local service areas. Indeed, if one counts wireless
telephony alone as being in the relevant market with conventional wireline
local exchange service, all of local telecommunications would easily qualify
facing "effective competition" under Congress' 1992 standard for cable. In fact,
however, the telecommunications market is quickly becoming far more
competitive than subscription video after factoring in the multiple wireless,
landline, and cable-based solutions.
172 47 U.S.C. § 543 (2000).
173 Implementation of Section of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992 Rate Regulation, 8 F.C.C.R. 5631, 8 (1993). Since passage of the 1992 Cable Act, cable
systems have met significant competition from the two, major direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers
operating in the United States. In June of 1993 cable operators held over 95% of the subscription video
market in the United States. By June 2004 that market share had fallen to 72%, with the second and
fourth largest providers being satellite companies. FCC, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF
COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR THE DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING: ELEVENTH ANNUAL




Wireless communications provide the second relevant precedent for a
deregulatory move in conventional, wireline telecommunications. In 1984, the
FCC defined geographic markets for cellular telephony and licensed two
carriers in each market. Although the FCC did not impose regulation on these
cellular duopolies, some state regulators did regulate cellular prices. In 1993,
when Congress authorized the auction of radio spectrum that would enable
"Personal Communications Service" (PCS) operators to enter the market in
competition with incumbent cellular carriers, it simultaneously greatly reduced
the ability of states to regulate the rates or operations of wireless carriers. 174 At
the time Congress preempted such wireless regulation, the market was still a
duopoly of the original cellular licensees. It is moreover important that the
newly entering PCS carriers not only had to incur the fixed costs of building
their own networks to compete with the already-established cellular carriers
and overcome a sizable marketing and brand-recognition deficit, but also had to
pay sizable sums for spectrum that the cellular licensees had received for free.
Congress nonetheless opted for deregulation in the wireless marketplace.
In the wake of that decision the new entrants not only built their own networks,
but deployed state-of-the-art technology with which the incumbents eventually
had to catch up. As already mentioned, the real consumer price of wireless
subscription dropped 34% from 1997 to 2002.175 If one considers only wireline
providers, the local telecommunications market is less consistent in its structure
than the wireless market. But even at its most concentrated the local market is
fast approaching and surpassing the duopoly structure in place when Congress
deregulated wireless. 176
The final example of precedent for deregulation in the face of emerging
competition is long-distance telephone service. Even after divestiture, AT&T
faced regulation that did not apply to its emerging competitors. The FCC
classified AT&T's competitors as "non-dominant" carriers that had to file
tariffs but whose rates were presumptively valid and could take effect within a
day of filing. AT&T, on the other hand, was classified as dominant and had to
file tariffs as much as 90 days in advance of the rate's effective date. The FCC
in 1995 finally reclassified AT&T as non-dominant, at which time AT&T still
had over 50% market share of the long distance market. 177 The market was at
that point essentially deregulated, despite having only three major players, one
of whom was substantially larger than the others.
Not only is there precedent from within U.S. telecommunications for
deregulating local telecommunications as competition evolves, but there is
foreign precedent as well. Telecommunications in the European Union (EU) is
174 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2000).
175 Tenth CMRS Report, supra note 1, at 157.
176 See Sections II.B and JIC, supra.
177 Motion of AT&T to be Reclassified as a Non Dominant Carrier, 11 F.C.C.R. 3271 (1995).
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both a national and EU-wide matter. Individual member states set their own
policies, but they do so pursuant to a "Framework Directive" of the European
Parliament. 178 The Framework Directive expressly recognizes that ex ante rules
to safeguard against monopoly need to adapt to changing market conditions.
179
Indeed, the Framework Directive allows such ex ante regulation of
telecommunications carriers only where there is a firm with "significant market
power" and where general competition law would be ineffective. 180 France
recently put the Framework Directive into practice in deregulating the retail
rates of France Telecom, the country's incumbent telecommunications
carrier. The French telecommunications authority, ARCEP, stated that
changing market conditions as well as the access rules put in place pursuant to
the Framework Directive had led to the development of significant broadband
competition.182 ARCEP found the pressure from broadband competition and
resale sufficient to warrant phased deregulation of France Telecom's retail
business. 183 Significantly, ARCEP ordered such deregulation on the strength of
evidence of competitive growth, not on the existence of already-mature and
substantial competition. ARCEP relied partly on the rapid growth of voice-
over-Internet competition in the year preceding the decision, even while noting
that such competition only encompassed 7% of telephone traffic in the relevant
market. 184 The French regulatory authority similarly recognized drawbacks and
limits to wholesale competition, but nonetheless found it sufficiently strong to
support retail deregulation in the evolving French telecommunications
market. 1 
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In addition to the above examples from the telecommunications sector,
there is empirical evidence from a number of other industries in the United
States showing benefits from deregulation and, moreover, suggesting that
delays in deregulating are costly to competition and consumers. In a survey of
the results of deregulation in the transportation, communications, financial
services, and energy sectors, Clifford Winston found that deregulation
produced substantial consumer benefits. 86 Winston's objective was to examine
178 Council Directive 2002/21, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33 (EC), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/_10820020424en00330050.pdf.
179 Id. 25.
180 Id. 25. The Framework Directive elsewhere defines "significant market power" as "the
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers, and ultimately
consumers." Id. at art. 14, 2.
181 Authorit6 de R6gulation des Communications llectroniques des Postes, ARCEP, Analyse
des March6s, Projet de d6cision portant modification de la d6cision no. 05-0571 de 27 Septembre 2005
d'analyse des march6s de la t61phonie fixe (July 25, 2006) [hereinafter ARCEP Decision], available at
http://www.art-telecom.fT/fileadmin/uploads/tx-gspublication/projdec-06-0840-250706.pdf.




186 Clifford Winston, Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J.
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whether economists' predictions about the effects of deregulation were
matched by actual effects.1 87 He found that economists did a good job of
predicting the effect of deregulation on prices but that economists
systematically underestimated the non-price benefits of deregulation such as
service quality and innovation.' 88 Despite some variation in the deregulatory
benefits across the sectors he studies, Winston concludes that the evidence
strongly supports realization of the predicted benefits of deregulation in
industries in transition to competition.
A recent study by Professors Charles Fine and John de Figueiredo
examines deregulation of railroads, natural gas, banking, and airlines (as well
as mobile telephony). The authors find the evidence across industries to show
that once competition develops in a regulated industry, deregulation that is too
slow and incremental only harms consumers and distorts economic
incentives. 89
Each industry in Fine and de Figueiredo's study experienced some
disruption that made the old monopoly regulation problematic and made
competition viable.190 The authors examine the costs of continued regulation as
new competition emerged and the competitive consequences of the form and
speed of deregulation that regulators chose in each case.' 91 The lesson the study
draws is that history counsels rapid and substantial deregulation of the U.S.
telecommunications industry.1 92 The railroad freight, natural gas, banking, and
airline industries all experienced successful periods of regulation under various
rationales of fair pricing and universal access, natural monopoly, and consumer
safety. Following that period of successful regulation, each of those industries
confronted a significant change that regulators had not unforeseen and that
existing regulation could not take into account. 9 3 In the 1950s, railroads faced
new competition from trucking and the newly developed highway system.' 94 In
the 1970s, the natural gas industry faced huge demand shocks in response to
OPEC's 1973 oil embargo. 9 5 Unusually high inflation in the 1970s saw
traditional banks losing customers to the new Money Market Mutual Funds.
196
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1272, 1276-77.
189 Charles H. Fine & John M. de Figueiredo, Can We Avoid Repeating the Mistakes of the
Past in Telecommunications Regulatory Reform? 5 (MIT Commc'ns Futures Program, Working Paper
No. 2005-001, 2005).
190 ld. at 8-9.
191 Id. at 9-10.
192 Id. at 11.
193 Id. at 4.
194 Id. at 11-12.
195 Id. at 15.
196 Id. at 18-19.
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High fuel prices as well as new competition from charter airlines and jet service
disrupted the airline industry in the 1970s.1
97
Regulators responded to these disruptions in a variety of ways. In the
railroad industry, the Interstate Commerce Commission did not effectively
respond to the changing conditions for 25 years. During that time, the rail
infrastructure deteriorated, the trucking industry enjoyed higher freight profits
because railroads were constrained, and a large number of railroads went
bankrupt. 198  In the natural gas industry, incremental and incomplete
deregulation over twenty years saw the persistent under-development of
pipelines and reserves, whereas full economic deregulation brought in
efficiency-enhancing restructuring of the distribution system and price
competition and stabilization. 199 The piecemeal deregulation of the banking
industry in the 1970s and 1980s created perverse incentives for savings and
loan managers to lend with insufficient reserves while shifting risk to
taxpayers, resulting in a crisis estimated to cost the government $160-$500
billion in saving and loan bail-outs. 20 0 Only in the 19 9 0s did more systematic




The three case studies just described illustrate the costs of slow and
piecemeal deregulation of an industry in the wake of disruptions and the
eventual cure, albeit late, of more complete economic deregulation. The
authors' other two case studies illustrate the benefits from quick and substantial
deregulation. In the airline industry, the disruptions caused by high fuel prices
and new, competitive services were answered with sweeping economic
deregulation in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.202 As a result, the airline
industry dramatically and efficiently restructured itself, fares decreased while
more people traveled, under-served markets saw increased service, and
discount services like Southwest Airlines provided new options for
consumers. 203 The study estimates the benefit from airline deregulation to be
$15-$18 billion annually.
Fine and de Figueiredo find the mobile telephony market to offer an even
more dramatic illustration of the benefits of swift deregulation. In the early
1990s, innovations in mobile telephony induced deregulation of wireless
telephony through the auctioning of "Personal Communications" spectrum,
Congress and the FCC removed restriction on the number of carriers per market
and phased out cellular price regulation. 20 4 As a result of this deregulation,
wireless rates have decreased substantially while use of wireless services has
197 Id. at 20-21.
198 Id. at 12-14.
199 Id. at 15-17.
200 Id. at 18.
201 Id. at 19.
202 Id. at 20-21.
203 Id. at 20-21.
204 Id. at 23.
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increased, and consumers have benefited from technological innovations driven
205by the competitive process.
The foregoing case studies support the general conclusion that slow,
piecemeal deregulation in an industry facing new competitive pressures comes
only at a cost to consumers, industry, and government. In contrast, decisive
deregulation in response to new competitive pressures results in social gains
from innovation, investment, and efficiency while consumers also gain from
the competitive effect on prices.20 6 The lessons from the railroad, natural gas,
banking, airlines, and wireless deregulation are to deregulate quickly and
substantially when such competitive forces arise. This reasoning applies today
to the U.S. telecommunications industry. The competitive pressures from
wireless and cable broadband networks indicate that the past monopoly
regulation of wireline telephony is no longer an appropriate paradigm.207 The
next question to be addressed is what should replace that paradigm.
D. A New Regulatory Approach: Emphasis on Targeted, Ex Post
Enforcement
A recommendation against substantial ex ante regulation does not mean
that the U.S. telecommunications market should be without oversight or some
basic "rules-of-the-road." The analysis of this Article does not, for example,
necessarily imply an end to narrow rules targeted at specific, non-economic
objectives like public safety (e.g. the new 911 regulations for VoIP providers)
or accessibility, which might still make sense in a competitive environment.
Nor does it lead to the conclusion that Congress or the FCC should eliminate
competitively neutral rules that obligate competing networks to exchange
traffic. This is not to say that interconnection should forever be mandatory, just
that one cannot resolve the question based on the same competitive analysis
that I argue to resolve the question of unbundling and retail market power.
Competitors taking small market shares or offering imperfect substitutes may
well discipline the price and output decisions of an incumbent firm. But
interconnection may be the very thing that allows those competitors to exist in
a network industry and incumbents may have little incentive to provide
interconnection under conditions of asymmetric market share. Before
interconnection can be declared as better left to the market than to regulatory
mandate, the competitive conditions under which the market will sufficiently
provide it need to be carefully identified. It may well be that an ILEC has
incentive to interconnect with the wireless carriers who now serve more lines
than the ILECs themselves. But whether the ILECs would interconnect
205 Id. at 23-24.
206 Id. at 26.
207 Id. at 27.
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voluntarily with CLECs, or whether large wireless carriers would voluntarily
interconnect with small, regional carriers is less certain, and such
interconnection may be critical to competition and market performance.
208
Ultimately, interconnection is a point for further study and debate, which are
already well under way. 
°9
Most importantly, nothing in this Article's competitive analysis counsels
against enjoining specific instances of conduct that proves to be harmful to
competition and consumers: In fact, it is exactly such post-conduct enforcement
responses that are appropriate in the current environment of the
telecommunications market. It is hard for regulators or Congress to know in
advance what strategies will lead to the most competitive environment or be
most responsive to consumer desires. Rules designed to restrain or govern firm
behavior on a prospective basis may distort competition with little expected
payoff. But responding to behavior that proves anticompetitive as it arises
allows authorities to prevent (and deter) harmful activity without impeding or
deterring beneficial competition.
It bears mentioning at this point that just as ex ante regulations against
monopoly power must evolve in the face of competition, the prospects for
effective ex post enforcement against anticompetitive conduct will diminish if
the relevant market reverts to a non-competitive structure. For that reason
merger enforcement must play an important role in telecommunications policy.
An analysis of telecommunications mergers is beyond the scope of this Article.
For current purposes I simply note that preserving the independence of rival
telecommunications platforms is essential future market performance and thus
constitutes an important part of telecommunications policy going forward. The
FCC and the antitrust agencies will have to remain vigilant about consolidation
both within platforms (e.g., one wireless carrier merging with another) and
across platforms (e.g., a telephone carrier with a cable operator). The kind of
enforcement shown by the antitrust agencies and the FCC in such cases as the
proposed Echostar/DirecTV merger
2 1° and proposed Worldcom/Sprint
2 11
208 One challenge for interconnection regulation is establishing a default price for
interconnection. In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress essentially established a marginal
cost pricing rule for interconnection. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (referring to "additional" costs
as the standard). As the additional or marginal costs of originating or terminating a call are very low-
very close to zero-one promising solution to the interconnection pricing problem is "bill and keep," in
which no carrier pays another for interconnection but instead recovers interconnection costs from its
own customers. See, e.g., Patrick DeGraba, Central Office Bill and Keep as a Unified Inter-Carrier
Compensation Regime, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 37 (2002). The feasibility of such zero-price solutions
suggest that the difficulties of interconnection pricing are manageable and should not be assumed to
offset the potential benefits of eliminating mandatory interconnection.
209 See, e.g., RANDOLPH J. MAY & RICHARD 0. LEVINE, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND.,
INTERCONNECTION WITHOUT REGULATION: LESSONS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM FROM FOUR
NETWORK INDUSTRIES (2005), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/communications/books/051018lnterconnection.pdf.
210 Application of EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., et al., 17 F.C.C.R. 20,559 (2002); Press
Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Statement by R. Hewitt Pate on the Abandonment of the
Hughes/EchoStar Transaction (Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/-
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merger will be essential to preserving the competition that has generated the
empirical results discussed above in Part II.
1. Ex Post Competition Enforcement
The ex post enforcement regime this Article recommends is analogous to
rule-of-reason scrutiny under the U.S. antitrust laws. 212 Before the courts hold a
firm liable for conduct that could be anticompetitive-exclusive dealing, for
example-plaintiffs must prove actual anticompetitive effects that outweigh
pro-competitive benefits of the conduct.213 There is a reluctance to bar most
conduct in advance because many economic actions (excepting per se antitrust
violations like price fixing) may have either beneficial or harmful effects on
consumers, depending on specific circumstances. The emerging, competitive
market for U.S. telecommunications warrants the same ex post, case-by-case
perspective.
In recommending an antitrust-style approach I do not mean to imply that
current antitrust law should necessarily establish the limits of competition
policy that either antitrust agencies or sector-specific regulators apply in
enforcing against anticompetitive behavior. To be sure, antitrust in its current
state constitutes the essential backdrop for competition enforcement. Diligent
enforcement, against both anticompetitive conduct and harmful mergers, will
be important to preserve the competition among telecommunications platforms
demonstrated in Part II. But in the anticompetitive practices context, there are
limits to antitrust that might render the scope of prohibited behavior in a
particular market too narrow to protect competition and consumer welfare. For
example, the absence of any duty to deal or of a meaningful essential-facilities
doctrine in U.S. antitrust law (see the Trinko case)2 14 might hinder effective
competitive enforcement in an industry in transition from regulation to
unregulated competition. There may thus be good reason to give the FCC
authority, where necessary to promote consumer welfare, to mandate
interconnection or interoperability among networks. The question of the
substance of competition policy for telecommunications is, like the more
specific case of interconnection, a separate debate. But whatever the
substantive boundaries turn out to be, the argument here is that competition
pressreleases/2002/200539.htm.
211 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Sues to Block Worldcom's
Acquisition of Sprint (June 27, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases-
/2000/5049.htm.
212 See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 56-59 (2005) (discussing origins of rule-of-reason analysis in
American antitrust policy).
213 Id. at 38, 127.
214 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
(clarifying the lack of a duty to deal or of a Supreme Court-recognized essential facilities doctrine).
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policy should be enforced through ex post intervention rather than ex ante
regulation.
A reconsideration of the scope of ex post competition policy is
particularly important for a number of specific, contemporary issues in
telecommunications policy. A prime example is the question of "network
neutrality" currently under active debate in the United States Congress. 2 15 At
issue is whether Congress should require owners of physical networks-
telephone companies, cable operators, and wireless carriers-to treat in a non-
discriminatory manner all content and service providers that interact with
consumers over their networks. Under such a regulation, a cable carrier could
not, for example, offer higher speed connections (or particular terms for such
connections) to some voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers but not to
others. The idea behind the proposed regulation is to prevent network owners
from engaging in vertical discrimination that could make the Internet less
accessible to content and service providers who do not own their own physical
infrastructure so as to preserve the vibrant innovation in content, services, and
applications that open access to the Internet has sparked.216
Vertical non-discrimination rules like net neutrality are not costless. They
may entail costs for consumers, for producers, and for the regulatory process.
217
Given the costs of net neutrality, the proposed rule's intended benefits need to
be considered in light of the transforming market structure of U.S.
telecommunications. As the market becomes more competitive, the economic
rationale for net neutrality rules diminishes. As physical networks compete to
attract subscribers, they will have strong incentives to provide consumers with
the broadest and most attractive access to the Internet's myriad offerings. Any
network that offered consumers too constrained a set of choices for critical
content and applications would lose customers to networks without such
policies. As such, competition drives networks away from anticompetitive,
anti-consumer vertical discrimination. But competition would allow
discriminatory deals where they are in the interests of consumers and new
producers that consumers would like to see in the marketplace. Competition is
therefore preferable to regulation for determining the appropriate degree of net
neutrality. The question, then, is whether the degree of competition that exists
and that is likely to further develop in the reasonably foreseeable future is
sufficient to offset anti-consumer vertical conduct by network owners.
215 See Eric Bangeman, Network Neutrality Legislation on its Way, ARS TECHNIA, Mar. 2,
2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060302-6304.html.
216 For a recent scholarly work critical of network neutrality but explaining the history of the
debate, see Christopher Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005)
217 See DACA Regulatory Framework Working Group, The Digital Age Communication
Act's Regulatory Framework and Net Neutrality, THE PROGRESS AND FREEDOM FOUNDATION, Mar.
2005, http://www.pff.org/issuespubs/communications/other/031707dacastmt.pdf#search='DACA-




Returning to the data and the discussion of oligopoly above, there is
significant rivalry in the broadband market although not enough to guarantee
that market power will never be exercised. The key point, however, is that the
competition that exists is likely to provide performance for consumers that is
much better than monopoly; sufficiently so that the costs of net neutrality will
not predictably be offset by the benefits of such ex ante non-discrimination
rules. The current state of the market is unlikely to yield performance so good
that one can dispense with any and all need to worry about vertical
discrimination by networks. Indeed, returning to the example of retail rate
deregulation in France, ARCEP expressed concern about discriminatory
conduct as the relevant market was evolving, and maintained its anti-
discrimination mandate for France Telecom even while deregulating rates.
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But ARCEP also recognized that antidiscrimination rules could not be
presumed necessary, and pledged to reexamine its decision regularly.
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Similarly, the mere possibility of vertical discrimination does not automatically
imply the need for ex ante network neutrality rules. In the absence of evidence
that harmful economic discrimination is occurring and without a clearer
understanding of the implications of placing all internet access charges on end-
user consumers, the better policy may be to enforce ex post against specific
conduct that is discriminatory and that is harmful to competition and to
consumers. Antitrust-style, ex post enforcement can enable regulators to
prevent truly harmful acts without constraining beneficial arrangements in
dynamic markets related to the Internet.
Looking again at the question of the substance of ex post competition
enforcement, however, it is necessary for enforcers to have sufficient legal
tools to block harmful actions if such an approach is to succeed. As the point
made above with regard to Trinko suggests, the scope of existing antitrust law
might not reach far enough to achieve policy goals for telecommunications. But
this is not grounds for an ex ante network neutrality rule; it is instead grounds
for Congress to articulate a standard of network competition and conduct that
the FCC and the U.S. antitrust agencies can enforce without being blocked by
contrary precedent from general antitrust law. 22 Congress should also back this
mandate up with authority for the FCC to implement regulation requiring
network neutrality if, and only if, ex post enforcement proves inadequate and if,
and only if, market developments over time show genuine harms to consumers
and competition that can be fruitfully addressed by an ex ante rule. To
peremptorily bar such regulation by the FCC regardless of market conditions
makes little sense; just as little sense as jumping immediately to ex ante
218 ARCEP Decision, surpa note 181, at 9.
219 Id.
220 See id. at 10 for a proposal for such a legislative standard of unfair competition.
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network neutrality rules under the increasingly competitive conditions of the
telecommunications market.
A recent example of the ex post regulatory approach this Article
recommends is the FCC's 2005 enforcement action against Madison River
Communications for allegedly interfering with transmissions between its
customers and VoIP provider Vonage. 221 It is beyond the scope of this Article
to explore the facts or assess the merits of the FCC's case. The point of the
example for current purposes is the kind of regulatory approach it represents.
One solution to potential competitive discrimination is to impose rules that
mandate how telecommunications carriers transport and must transmit different
kinds of content and services. The other is to let competition between networks
govern such performance dimensions but to punish and enjoin discrimination
that proves to be anticompetitive. For the reasons discussed earlier in this
Article, the latter is far preferable in dynamic and uncertain markets where the
incentive distortions and unintended consequences of regulation are likely to
far outweigh any consumer benefits.
2. Further Considerations for the Ex Post Model
The antitrust-like model is not perfect. Some cases will escape scrutiny
altogether and some well-aimed enforcement efforts may fail. Moreover, some
harm generally accrues before agencies can seek a fine or injunction. Case-by-
case enforcement may in some circumstances also provide less certainty for
firms about the boundaries of acceptable conduct than ex ante rules provide.2 22
But these drawbacks must be weighed against the comparative costs of ex ante
regulation. Also to be considered is that enforcement problems and
compensation issues can be at least partially improved and addressed through
effective enabling legislation and proper institutional assignment--e.g., to one
of the antitrust agencies or to the FCC--of enforcement jurisdiction.223 More to
the point, ex post enforcement against specific, anticompetitive acts avoids the
kind of costs (discussed above in Section II.C) that ex ante rules can create
through their imposition of one-size-fits-all requirements and restrictions. As
the benefits of ex ante regulation diminish with competition, the more targeted
approach of ex post competition enforcement becomes more appropriate. The
221 In re Madison River Commc'ns, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).
222 The concern about uncertainty should not be overstated. There is a substantial body of
precedent and experience with antitrust enforcement that provides guidance to firms about what
constitutes anticompetitive behavior, and which has mitigated uncertainty in antitrust enforcement.
There is no reason to expect that over time uncertainty need be any greater a problem for industries in
which antitrust-style enforcement comes to supplant regulation than it has been in antitrust generally.
223 The question of institutional jurisdiction over enforcement of competition policy in the
telecommunications industry is beyond the scope of this paper. An excellent discussion of this issue can
be found in the final chapter of JONATHAN NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE (2005).
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empirical evidence that the U.S. telecommunications market has reached that
crossroad is compelling.
IV. Conclusion
As telecommunications markets in the United States transform, regulation
has remained essentially static in its fundamental approach and monopoly
assumptions. To be sure, regulation has changed in its emphasis and particulars.
But at the state level and in several important areas of federal regulation, rules
remain whose motivating, monopoly conditions no longer hold. As long as the
conventional monopoly model of regulation remains in place, it risks increasing
harm to the incentives of incumbents and new entrants alike to invest and
compete in ways that benefit American consumers. A shift to a regulatory
approach that focuses on competition and-like antitrust enforcement-
intervenes ex post to punish and enjoin anticompetitive conduct, is more
appropriate to the competitive environment. When supported by carefully
targeted, competitively neutral regulation to promote basic interconnection,
ensure public safety, and protect distributional objectives, the ex post approach
will mitigate risks and allow consumers to gain more from competition than
retention of conventional regulation will allow.

